N.T. v. H.T.
246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- N. obtained a TRO (Jan 2017) prohibiting H. from contacting or harassing her, obtaining her address, disturbing her peace, and limiting contact to peaceful child-exchange communications; exchanges later set at Mission Viejo PD.
- In Sept 2017 N. sought a permanent DVRO based entirely on alleged TRO violations (e.g., prolonged/relationship-focused speech at exchanges, refusal/delay returning child, early pickup, leaving a religious/self-help letter in child’s bag, appearing near N.’s residence).
- H. contested the allegations, admitting some conduct (giving letter/rose, appearing at exchanges) but characterizing contacts as limited, benign, or justified.
- Trial court denied the DVRO, viewing the asserted acts as mere "technical" TRO violations and ruling that a TRO violation alone is not necessarily domestic violence.
- Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding TRO-prohibited conduct can constitute "abuse" under the DVPA and directing the trial court to make factual findings and issue the DVRO if the acts are proven.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (N.) | Defendant's Argument (H.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether violating a TRO can constitute "abuse" under the DVPA | TRO-prohibited behaviors (harassment, contacting, disturbing peace, obtaining address) are statutorily abuse and support a DVRO | A TRO violation is not per se domestic violence; these were technical/de minimis breaches | Reversed: Section 6203(a)(4) makes engaging in behavior enjoined by §6320 "abuse"; TRO violations can support a DVRO |
| Whether the alleged conduct (even absent the TRO) constituted abuse | The conduct (persistent nonvisitation-limited contact, withholding child, stalking, disturbing peace, letter) independently breached N.’s peace and qualified as abuse | Characterized conduct as limited, benign, or explained by logistics (e.g., waiting for officer) | Reversed: the alleged actions, if proven, would independently constitute abuse and justify a DVRO |
| Proper standard of review for denial of DVRO | Trial court must apply DVPA statutory definitions and make factual findings; appellate review is de novo on legal standard and abuse of discretion on issuance | Trial court applied discretion but concluded violations were merely technical | Court found trial court applied incorrect legal standard and remanded for factual findings; appellate court did not weigh evidence |
| Remedy when trial court uses incorrect legal standard | Enter DVRO if facts undisputed and law compels it | Opposed — factual disputes preclude directed relief | Remanded: trial court to make findings; if it finds acts occurred, it must issue the DVRO |
Key Cases Cited
- Nakamura v. Parker, 156 Cal.App.4th 327 (appellate court 2007) (appealability of DVPA orders)
- Cueto v. Dozier, 241 Cal.App.4th 550 (appellate court 2015) (de novo review for legal standards in DVRO denials)
- In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 (appellate court 2009) (interpreting "disturbing the peace" to include emotional/mental disturbance)
- Caldwell v. Coppola, 219 Cal.App.3d 859 (appellate court 1990) (broad protective purpose of DVPA)
- Lister v. Bowen, 215 Cal.App.4th 319 (appellate court 2013) (knowing TRO violations not necessarily de minimis)
- Rodriguez v. Menjivar, 243 Cal.App.4th 816 (appellate court 2015) (mental abuse and controlling behavior relevant to DVRO)
- Burquet v. Brumbaugh, 223 Cal.App.4th 1140 (appellate court 2014) (supporting Nadkarni's interpretation of "disturbing the peace")