915 N.W.2d 106
N.D.2018Background
- Petition to terminate parental rights to infant J.J.T. was filed June 23, 2014, by the paternal grandfather; child had lived with grandfather since May 2014.
- Allegations included mother's (J.G.) illicit drug use, leaving the infant unattended, and a hair test showing multiple illicit drugs.
- Multiple continuances and delays occurred from 2014–2018; J.G. repeatedly sought continuances, delayed applying for appointed counsel, and failed to cooperate with appointed counsel.
- Court-appointed counsel changed several times; most recently Daniel Gulya was appointed in January 2018, moved for a continuance which was denied, then moved to withdraw and was ordered to remain as standby counsel.
- Termination trial proceeded February 8, 2018 with J.G. self‑represented (standby counsel assisting). Juvenile court terminated J.G.’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment, aggravated circumstances, and deprivation.
- On appeal J.G. argued denial of counsel (denial of continuance, withdrawal of counsel, and that her waiver was not voluntary/knowing) and challenged the deprivation finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (N.M.T.) | Defendant's Argument (J.G.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of continuance of Feb. 8, 2018 hearing | Trial should proceed; prior delays warranted finality | Gulya/J.G.: inadequate time to prepare; counsel had conflicting trials | Court did not abuse discretion in denying continuance (delay largely attributable to J.G.) |
| Granting counsel's motion to withdraw / appointment as standby | Withdrawal proper given counsel’s lack of ability to prepare; standby counsel appropriate | J.G.: improper denial of effective counsel at trial | Withdrawal and standby appointment were not an abuse of discretion (good cause shown) |
| Whether J.G. was denied statutory/right to counsel (waiver validity) | Waiver was functionally implied by J.G.’s obstructive/dilatory conduct | J.G.: she did not knowingly/voluntarily waive counsel and preferred not to self‑represent | Court held J.G.’s conduct amounted to a functional, voluntary, knowing, intelligent waiver of counsel |
| Merits of termination (deprivation/other grounds) | Grandfather: statutory grounds for termination satisfied (abandonment, aggravated circumstances, deprivation) | J.G.: challenges deprivation and likelihood of continued harm/remedy | Appeal waived challenges to abandonment and aggravated‑circumstances findings; court’s termination upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Interest of J.C., 2007 ND 111, 736 N.W.2d 451 (standard for abuse of discretion on continuance motions)
- Interest of I.B.A., 2008 ND 89, 748 N.W.2d 688 (parental right to counsel; standards for withdrawal and standby counsel)
- State v. Yost, 2014 ND 209, 855 N.W.2d 829 (functional waiver analysis; review of waiver de novo)
- State v. Dvorak, 2000 ND 6, 604 N.W.2d 445 (two‑part inquiry for waiver: voluntary and knowing/intelligent)
- State v. Schneeweiss, 2001 ND 120, 630 N.W.2d 482 (conduct can be functional equivalent of waiver)