348 P.3d 1237
Wash. Ct. App.2015Background
- NL (14) and Clark (18) were students in the same district; both on track teams that practiced together on a field linking junior high and high school.
- Clark had a long disciplinary history for sexual and assaultive conduct, was convicted in 9th grade, and registered as a level-one sex offender more than two years before the assault on NL.
- School officials (principal Riley-Hordyk and BSD) did not follow policy to notify teachers/coaches, had no formal monitoring or written safety plan for registered sex-offender students, and conducted only an informal, undocumented process.
- Clark met NL at practice, lied about his age, lured her off campus and sexually assaulted her; he later pleaded guilty to second-degree assault and failure to register.
- NL sued BSD for negligence alleging the district knew of Clark’s dangerousness, failed to monitor him, and that this breach proximately caused her assault; the trial court granted summary judgment for BSD.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding BSD owed NL a duty and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to breach and proximate causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did BSD owe a duty to protect NL from Clark? | BSD had custody/responsibility for students and knew Clark’s dangerous propensities and sex-offender status, creating a duty to protect and monitor. | BSD argued duty did not extend to off-campus assault and was too remote. | Duty existed: BSD owed reasonable care to protect and monitor given knowledge of Clark’s dangerousness. |
| Was BSD’s failure to monitor/breach of duty established? | BSD lacked policies, failed to notify teachers/coaches, and did not create a safety plan—expert testified this breached standard of care. | BSD asserted no actionable breach as a matter of law. | Breach is a factual question: evidence and unrebutted expert opinion create genuine issues for a jury. |
| Was NL’s assault reasonably foreseeable (proximate cause)? | Given Clark’s history and registration, reoffense was foreseeable; district’s inaction could be a proximate cause. | BSD argued the off-campus, intervening criminal act was unforeseeable and too remote as a matter of law. | Foreseeability and proximate cause are for the jury; the harm was not so extraordinary as to negate legal causation. |
| Was summary judgment appropriate? | NL showed factual disputes on duty, breach, and proximate cause precluding summary judgment. | BSD claimed no duty or foreseeability as matter of law, warranting summary judgment. | Summary judgment was improper; reversal and remand for trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42 Wn.2d 316 (1953) (school’s duty to protect students and foreseeability inquiry)
- J.N. v. Bellingham Sch. Dist. No. 501, 74 Wn. App. 49 (1994) (knowledge of a student’s dangerousness can preclude summary judgment)
- Kok v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 179 Wn. App. 10 (2013) (no duty where harm was not reasonably foreseeable from school records)
- Lowman v. Wilbur, 178 Wn.2d 165 (2013) (elements of negligence and proximate cause discussion)
- Travis v. Bohannon, 128 Wn. App. 231 (2005) (intervening actor and jury’s role on concurrent/superseding causes)
- Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768 (1985) (cause-in-fact usually for the factfinder)
- Seeberger v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 138 Wn.2d 815 (1999) (harm must be highly extraordinary to defeat foreseeability as matter of law)