N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.L.M. (In re R.A.J.), 198 A.3d 934

Background

The New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency filed to terminate parental rights to R.A.J.; guardianship trial found clear-and-convincing evidence under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and terminated rights of both parents.
J.J., the father, initially told the court at an early case management conference he wanted to proceed pro se, then immediately requested assigned counsel and accepted appointed counsel through pretrial proceedings.
During trial J.J. sought to discharge his counsel and either obtain new counsel or represent himself; the trial court denied the late, renewed request as disruptive and likely to delay permanency for the child.
The Appellate Division affirmed the termination and rejected a constitutional right to self-representation in noncriminal parental-termination proceedings; this Court granted certification on J.J.’s claim that denial of his request for self-representation required a new trial.
The Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.4 allows a parent to represent himself or herself in a termination-of-rights action (subject to court-imposed limits), but that J.J.’s belated and ambivalent invocation was properly denied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a parent has the statutory/right to represent oneself in a TPR action	Division: no constitutional self-representation right; statutory assignment of counsel is for indigent parents on request and does not mandate counsel	J.J.: statute and due process permit self-representation; he timely invoked the right at CMC	Court: Statute permits parental self-representation; parents may proceed pro se subject to limits and procedures
What procedural limits apply to parental self-representation	Division: court may require timely, unequivocal invocation and may deny disruptive/untimely requests	J.J.: need not satisfy strict timeliness/clarity; his early statement was sufficient	Court: parent must invoke clearly, unequivocally, timely; court may require colloquy, appoint standby counsel, or deny late/ambiguous requests
Whether trial court erred denying J.J.’s mid-trial request to go pro se	J.J.: denial violated his right to control representation and demanded new trial	Division: request was equivocal and came too late, would have prejudiced child’s permanency	Court: denial proper — J.J. withdrew initial pro se claim, later request was untimely/ambivalent and would have delayed permanency
Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising statutory/constitutional self-representation claims	J.J.: appellate counsel should have raised statutory and substantive-due-process claims	Division: any such claim fails because J.J.’s invocation was ambiguous and untimely	Court: claim fails on prejudice prong; J.J. cannot show he was prejudiced because his invocation was untimely and unclear

Key Cases Cited

In re Civil Commitment of D.Y., 218 N.J. 359 (2014) (recognized limited self-representation rights in SVPA civil-commitment hearings and prescribed inquiry/standby counsel guidance)
In re Adoption of a Child by J.E.V. and D.G.V., 226 N.J. 90 (2016) (approved an "abbreviated yet meaningful" colloquy for parents waiving counsel in contested adoption)
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (discussed role of expert evidence and procedural protections in termination proceedings)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (established heightened due-process concerns and standards in parental-termination cases)
In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1 (1992) (recognized the severe and irreversible nature of terminating parental rights)