N. Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed'n, Inc., 883 F.3d 32

Background

USSF (U.S. Soccer Federation) annually designates professional men's soccer leagues as Division I, II, or III under promulgated "Professional League Standards;" leagues may seek waivers and the USSF Board (with Task Force recommendations) votes on designation.
MLS has occupied Division I since its inception; NASL operated as a Division II league (2011–2017) and applied for Division II for 2018 seeking waivers for team/time‑zone requirements but was denied by USSF.
NASL sued USSF alleging a § 1 Sherman Act conspiracy with MLS, USL, and SUM to manipulate the Standards and exclude competition, and moved for a preliminary injunction directing USSF to grant NASL Division II status pending litigation.
The District Court denied the mandatory‑style preliminary injunction after detailed factual findings, concluding NASL failed to show a clear likelihood of success on the merits of its § 1 claim.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed: it held the injunction was properly analyzed as mandatory (heightened standard) and concluded NASL had not demonstrated concerted action or that the Standards were an unreasonable restraint of trade under the full rule‑of‑reason framework.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper preliminary‑injunction standard	NASL: relief merely preserves benefits it long received; ordinary standard applies	USSF: injunction would alter the long‑standing annual designation process; mandatory standard applies	Court: mandatory standard applies because NASL sought to alter the parties' pre‑controversy relationship; heightened showing required
Existence of a § 1 conspiracy (concerted action)	NASL: promulgation/amendment/application of Standards, SUM relationship, and Board votes amount to concerted action to exclude competition	USSF: standards and votes reflect independent federation decisions; Task Force/abstention rules limit conflicted voting; no proof of an agreement to act in concert	Court: Monsanto/Matsushita framework applies; promulgation is circumstantial evidence but NASL failed to exclude independent action; no clear likelihood of proving concerted conspiracy
Whether the challenged conduct is per se illegal or requires rule‑of‑reason	NASL: conduct is plainly anticompetitive (urged a quick‑look)	USSF: sports‑league regulation is complex and often has procompetitive justifications; full rule of reason applies	Court: full rule of reason applies given potential procompetitive justifications (stability, avoiding free‑riding)
Unreasonable restraint and less‑restrictive alternatives	NASL: Standards (or their application) unduly raise barriers; earlier, looser Standards or league‑based rules would be less restrictive	USSF: Standards promote league stability, fan interest, market quality; earlier Standards or purely league rules would not achieve same benefits	Court: USSF demonstrated procompetitive effects; NASL failed to show viable, less‑restrictive alternatives or a clear likelihood of prevailing on § 1 claim

Key Cases Cited

Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (defines concerted action requirement under § 1)
Monsanto Co. v. Spray‑Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (direct and circumstantial evidence standards for inferring conspiracy)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (parallel conduct consistent with lawful behavior does not alone infer conspiracy)
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (league regulation often analyzed under rule of reason; some horizontal restraints necessary in sports)
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (standards may have procompetitive effects; distinguishes quick‑look vs full rule of reason)
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (market‑power concept and exclusionary authority)
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (test for whether a restraint merely regulates competition or suppresses it)