Myra Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC
843 F.3d 1295
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Furcron, an MCP mailroom employee at a Coca‑Cola site, worked six days alongside co‑worker Daniel Seligman after his November 2012 transfer; she alleged repeated sexualized conduct (staring, attempts to look down her shirt, and deliberate bumping/rubbing while he had an erection).
- Furcron complained to her KOR supervisor (Maloney) and later to HR/managers, produced a photograph of Seligman’s crotch to document an erection, and emailed HR expressing fear for her safety.
- MCP suspended Furcron during an investigation and terminated her December 7, 2012, stating she took sexually suggestive pictures of a male associate without permission and displayed them to others; MCP also cited showing the photo after being instructed not to and contacting Coca‑Cola.
- Furcron filed an EEOC charge and sued under Title VII for hostile work environment (sexual harassment) and retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment for MCP after excluding portions of Furcron’s declaration and the entire declaration of co‑worker Tameka Johnson.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on retaliation but vacated and remanded the sexual‑harassment ruling because excluding Johnson’s declaration was an abuse of discretion and likely not harmless.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether harassment was “based on sex” (hostile work environment) | Furcron: evidence (her testimony, photo, coworker Johnson) shows sexualized conduct directed at her because of her gender | MCP: Seligman’s conduct arose from disability/odd behavior, not sexual discrimination; plaintiff lacks evidence linking conduct to sex | Vacated and remanded as to harassment: exclusion of Johnson’s declaration was erroneous and may have affected the "based on sex" finding; remand for further proceedings |
| Admissibility of Furcron’s post‑deposition declaration (sham‑affidavit rule) | Furcron: declaration clarifies/augments deposition; should not be struck for credibility reasons | MCP/Magistrate: portions contradict deposition and therefore excluded under sham‑affidavit doctrine | Court: exclusion of certain contradictory portions was within discretion (not abuse) but applied narrowly; some exclusions upheld |
| Admissibility of Tameka Johnson’s declaration | Furcron: Johnson’s sworn statements corroborate harassment and that complaints were made; relevant and admissible | MCP/Magistrate: declaration immaterial (and raised credibility/timeliness issues) | Court: exclusion was an abuse of discretion; Johnson’s testimony was relevant to whether harassment was based on sex and exclusion was not harmless; remand required |
| Retaliation: whether Furcron engaged in protected activity and whether MCP’s reasons for termination were pretextual | Furcron: she complained (informally and via email), showed photo to supervisors, had objectively reasonable belief she opposed sexual harassment | MCP: Furcron did not adequately communicate a sexual‑harassment complaint; termination was for legitimate reasons (taking/showing photo, violating instruction not to discuss investigation, contacting client) | Affirmed for MCP: court found Furcron’s deposition met the prima facie protected‑activity standard, but MCP produced legitimate reasons and Furcron failed to show pretext as to each reason; summary judgment on retaliation affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (hostile work environment actionable under Title VII)
- Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (severity/pervasiveness standard for hostile work environment)
- Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to be discrimination based on sex)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden‑shifting framework for disparate treatment/retaliation claims)
- Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949 (sham‑affidavit doctrine guidance)
- Burdine v. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. 248 (prima facie burden and employer’s production burden)
- Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502 (plaintiff’s ultimate burden and credibility limits at the production stage)