Myers v. State
2017 Ark. App. 617
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2000, David Myers pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the second degree (Class A misdemeanor), was placed on 12 months’ probation, and ordered to register as a sex offender.
- After more than 15 years of registration, Myers petitioned (2016) under Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-919 to terminate his registration obligation, which permits termination after 15 years absent adjudication of a sex offense and a showing of low risk.
- Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-919(a)(1) requires lifetime registration for offenders found to have committed an “aggravated sex offense,” defined by reference to federal aggravated sexual abuse (18 U.S.C. § 2241 as of Mar. 1, 2003).
- The State argued Myers’s conviction qualified as an aggravated sex offense because (1) it involved a child under 12 and/or (2) it involved force; the circuit court found Myers’s offense met the force prong and denied relief.
- Myers appealed, arguing the circuit court misinterpreted “force” and that Arkansas sexual abuse in the second degree (which requires only “sexual contact”) is not substantially equivalent to federal aggravated sexual abuse (which requires a “sexual act”).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Myers) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Myers’s sexual-abuse-in-the-second-degree conviction is an "aggravated sex offense" under Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-903(3) | The court erred by defining “force” broadly; Arkansas offense lacks a force element and requires only sexual contact, so it is not substantially equivalent | The conviction qualifies as aggravated: either by force (broadly defined) or because victim was under 12 | Reversed: the Arkansas offense is not substantially equivalent to federal aggravated sexual abuse; lifetime registration not mandated |
| Proper meaning of “force” in comparing state statute to 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1) | “Force” should be understood as physical force (restraint, injury), not any influence or lack of consent | Court below treated “force” to include any means of obtaining submission (including nonphysical) | Court held the lower court’s broad definition was incorrect; statutory context requires limiting force to physical compulsion |
| Whether sexual "contact" in Ark. statute equals federal "sexual act" | Arkansas “sexual contact” is broader (includes touching through clothing of buttocks, breasts, anus) and thus differs from federal “sexual act” (touching genitalia not through clothing with specific sexual intent) | State alternatively argued Myers engaged with someone under 12, making it an aggravated child offense | Court held sexual contact distinct from federal sexual act; offenses not substantially equivalent |
| Whether subsection (c) of § 2241 (crimes against children) makes Arkansas offense equivalent when victim under 12 | Myers: even § 2241(c) requires a “sexual act,” which is distinct from Arkansas “sexual contact” | State: conviction involved a victim under 12, so subsection (c) applies | Court held subsection (c) still requires a federal “sexual act”; Arkansas offense does not meet that standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. State, 94 Ark. App. 240 (discussing de novo statutory interpretation and rule of lenity in criminal statutes)
- Burgess v. State, 2016 Ark. 175 (principles of statutory construction; give meaning to every word)
- United States v. Cloud, 780 F.3d 877 (Eighth Circuit: force element satisfied by overcoming, restraining, or injuring the victim)
- United States v. JDT, 762 F.3d 984 (interpreting § 2241(c) child-offense language)
- United States v. Bordeaux, 997 F.2d 419 (construing federal child-sex offense definitions)