Myers v. Ridgley
2017 Ark. App. 411
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Bert and Suzie divorced in 1999 after 29 years; the decree awarded Suzie a marital share of Bert’s vested reserve-duty (reserve) military retirement but did not award any share of Bert’s unvested active-duty retirement.
- At divorce, Bert was vested in reserve retirement but not in active-duty retirement; later he became vested in active-duty retirement and continued serving until 2012.
- In 2014 Suzie moved for a share of what she called “military retirement” (reserve and/or active); the circuit court entered a Supplemental Decree awarding her 33.7% of Bert’s military-retirement payments (which by then were active-duty benefits).
- Bert argued the Supplemental Decree erred because active-duty and reserve retirement are distinct and only vested retirement at the time of divorce is divisible; he appealed. Suzie sought to dismiss the appeal and cross-appealed seeking SBP (survivor-benefit plan) relief.
- The Court of Appeals denied Suzie’s motion to dismiss, reversed the Supplemental Decree (holding the court erred by awarding a share of active-duty retirement that was not vested at divorce), reversed related attorney-fee award, and affirmed denial of Suzie’s request to be named beneficiary under an SBP.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Suzie) | Defendant's Argument (Myers) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Supplemental Decree properly awarded Suzie a portion of Bert’s active-duty retirement | Suzie argued she was entitled to a share of “military retirement” (reserve and/or active) as divided post-decree when active-duty benefits became payable | Bert argued only retirement vested at the time of divorce is divisible; the 1999 decree gave Suzie reserve retirement only and did not reach unvested active-duty retirement | Reversed: Active-duty and reserve retirement are distinct; unvested active-duty retirement at divorce may not be divided (court followed Pelts) |
| Whether Bert’s appeal was moot because he voluntarily paid part of the judgment | Suzie argued partial payment moots appeal | Bert argued payment resolved a contemporaneous contempt threat and preserved appeal rights; record and court credit showed intent to preserve appeal | Denied dismissal: payment was not voluntary waiver and appeal not moot |
| Whether the circuit court could order Suzie named as SBP beneficiary | Suzie argued SBP relief was available under the decree and court’s retained-jurisdiction clause | Bert (and trial court) argued claim was barred by res judicata and decree did not specifically reserve SBP jurisdiction; Suzie failed to present evidence that SBP was an ‘‘entitlement’’ under the decree | Affirmed: SBP claim barred by res judicata and insufficient evidence; general reservation clause insufficient |
| Whether attorney’s fees tied to the Supplemental Decree should stand | Implicitly, Suzie argued fees were appropriate after Supplemental Decree relief | Bert argued decree awarding active-duty share (and related fees) was erroneous | Reversed: fees vacated along with erroneous award of active-duty retirement |
Key Cases Cited
- Christopher v. Christopher, 316 Ark. 215, 871 S.W.2d 398 (Ark. 1994) (military retirement divisible as marital property if vested at divorce)
- Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (Ark. 1993) (unvested military retirement not subject to division)
- Durham v. Durham, 289 Ark. 3, 708 S.W.2d 618 (Ark. 1986) (same principle: nonvested military retirement not divisible)
- Pelts v. Pelts, 2017 Ark. 98, 514 S.W.3d 455 (Ark. 2017) (reserve and active-duty retirement schemes are distinct; unvested active-duty retirement may not be divided)
- Nesbitt v. Nesbitt, 2016 Ark. App. 487, 503 S.W.3d 807 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016) (military retirement is marital property subject to Arkansas law on division)
- Askins v. Askins, 288 Ark. 333, 704 S.W.2d 632 (Ark. 1986) (discusses treatment of vested retirement and enhancements for property-division purposes)
- Lytle v. Citizens Bank of Batesville, 4 Ark. App. 294, 630 S.W.2d 546 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (voluntary satisfaction of judgment can render appeal moot)
- Brave v. Brave, 2014 Ark. 175, 433 S.W.3d 227 (Ark. 2014) (factors relevant to whether postjudgment payments waive appellate rights)
Reversed on direct appeal; affirmed on cross-appeal; motion to dismiss denied.