Myers v. Marietta Memorial Hospital
201 F. Supp. 3d 884
| S.D. Ohio | 2016Background
- Plaintiffs Lynnett Myers, Carol Butler, and Arva Lowther (former nurses) sued Memorial Health System and affiliated hospitals under the FLSA (and state wage law), alleging an automatic 30-minute meal deduction for direct-patient-care hourly staff even when breaks were missed, resulting in unpaid overtime.
- Plaintiffs seek conditional collective certification for "all current and former hourly employees responsible for direct patient care" subject to the automatic meal deduction during the three years before notice approval.
- Plaintiffs submitted three near-identical affidavits describing routine interruption of meal periods, discouragement or reprimands for cancelling automatic deductions, and that the automatic deduction applied systemwide to direct-patient-care staff.
- Defendants submitted 29 largely identical affidavits asserting employees were properly paid and could report interrupted breaks (some affidavits included disputed or inapplicable roles); defendants argued plaintiffs offered only speculation, too few affidavits, and a vague class definition.
- The Magistrate Judge compelled plaintiffs’ depositions and denied expedited discovery; plaintiffs sought reconsideration and a stay. The District Court granted conditional certification, denied reconsideration and stay as moot, and ordered the parties to confer on notice and opt-in procedures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether to grant conditional collective certification under the FLSA | Plaintiffs made the modest factual showing that direct-patient-care hourly employees are similarly situated because of a common automatic meal-deduction policy and routine interrupted breaks | Defendants said plaintiffs’ affidavits are speculative, too few, and class definition ("direct patient care") is vague and overbroad | Court granted conditional certification — plaintiffs met the lenient, first-stage "modest factual showing" standard |
| 2. Whether the Court may consider employer-collected affidavits at the conditional stage | Plaintiffs argued such affidavits are of limited value and should not defeat conditional certification, particularly before depositions/discovery | Defendants urged the Court to rely on their affidavits to show lack of common practice | Court declined to credit defendants’ affidavits at this stage, noting potential coercion and that weighing competing affidavits would require improper credibility determinations |
| 3. Whether a minimum number/percentage of affidavits is required for certification | Plaintiffs argued no bright-line numeric showing is required at the conditional stage; discovery follows certification | Defendants urged a percentage-based threshold given class size and contrary affidavits | Court rejected a bright-line percentage rule and declined to import the stricter Rule 23–style standard into the first phase; discovery/decertification is the remedy if warranted |
| 4. Whether Magistrate Judge erred in ordering plaintiffs’ depositions and denying expedited discovery | Plaintiffs sought bifurcated discovery and protection from depositions before conditional certification | Defendants sought depositions and opposed expedited discovery | Court held the reconsideration and stay motions moot because depositions had not yet occurred and conditional certification was granted; no reversible error shown under Rule 72(a) |
Key Cases Cited
- Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2006) (describes FLSA collective-action two-step certification framework and lenient first-stage standard)
- O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (explains "similarly situated" standard — common FLSA-violating policy suffices at first stage)
- Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946) (FLSA remedial purpose and evidentiary leniency for proving uncompensated work)
- Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (Congress enacted FLSA to protect employees lacking bargaining power)
- Moran v. Al Basit LLC, 788 F.3d 201 (6th Cir. 2015) (discusses FLSA remedial purpose in circuit context)
- Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S.Ct. 513 (2014) (supreme court discussion of scope of compensable work under FLSA)
- Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977) (characterizes FLSA as broadly remedial statute)
