Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537

Background

Jennifer Myers, a Hertz station manager, alleged FLSA overtime violations and argued Hertz misclassified her and others as exempt under 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) rather than paying overtime.
Hertz applied Policy 2-50, classifying all station managers nationwide as exempt executives without location-specific duties analysis.
Plaintiffs sought both individual FLSA overtime claims and a nationwide opt-in FLSA collective action under § 216(b), later pivoting to a Rule 23 NY labor law class claim for timely wage payments.
The district court denied Hertz’s summary judgment on the FLSA claim, but later held the plaintiffs could not prove a class-wide entitlement due to individualized duties questions and complex exemption determinations.
The district court denied certification of a Rule 23 NY Labor Law class, and this appeal followed, with the Second Circuit affirming the denial of class certification and declining to review the earlier Collective Action Order on appeal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Rule 23 class certification?	Myers argues common questions predominate due to shared duties and uniform exemption policy.	Hertz contends exemption requires individualized analysis of each employee's duties, precluding predominance.	No abuse; predominance not shown; class certification affirmed.
Whether the district court’s Collective Action Order under § 216(b) can be reviewed on appeal before Rule 23 certification determinations.	Collective Action Order should be reviewable as part of the appeal of the certification ruling.	Appellate jurisdiction does not extend to review of the earlier § 216(b) order.	Pendent appellate jurisdiction did not permit review of the Collective Action Order.
Whether exemption-based questions can be resolved on a class-wide basis for the NY Labor Law § 191 claim.	Common issues exist to show entitlement to overtime; § 191 overlaps with FLSA claim.	Exemption requires case-by-case analysis; § 191 is a timing provision, not a substantive relief.	Predominance not satisfied; reliance on common issues insufficient to certify.
Whether the district court properly treated the § 191 claim as derivative of the FLSA claim for class purposes.	§ 191 provides a parallel route to recover overtime via timely payment.	§ 191 does not independently establish substantive wages; it mirrors FLSA liability.	The § 191 claim is derivative of FLSA and not independently certifiable as a class claim.
Does the district court's handling of potential notice under § 216(b) affect the outcome on Rule 23 certification?	Notice should be permitted to determine if potential opt-ins are similarly situated.	Notice decisions depend on a modest showing and are distinct from Rule 23 predominance.	Not necessary to address for this appeal; focus remains on Rule 23 predominance and denial affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (Supreme Court, 1989) (establishes § 216(b) notice framework for collective actions)
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (Supreme Court, 1997) (class certification standards and predominance framework)
Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (evidence of employee duties across locations can support predominance)
Family Dollar Stores, Inc. v. Southeastern Employees, 551 F.3d 1233 (2d Cir. 2008) (modest showing standard for initial notice in § 216(b) actions; predominance considerations)
In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2008) (Rule 23 predominance and common questions analysis)
In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) (class action standards and predominance considerations in complex actions)
Wells Fargo Overtime Pay Litig., 571 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasizes commonality vs. individualized duties in exemption inquiries)