Music v. Arrowood Indemnity Co.
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2619
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Music, a Kentucky resident, was involved in a car accident and a default judgment was entered against him in Kentucky state court.
- Carpenter later sued for uninsured motorist benefits; Music listed no Arrowood dispute as an asset in bankruptcy filed in 2008, which discharged in 2008.
- In 2009, Music filed a fourth-party complaint against Arrowood for bad faith; the district court ordered severance on July 9, 2009.
- Arrowood removed the bad-faith action to federal court on July 20, 2009, based on diversity jurisdiction; Music moved to remand on October 27, 2009.
- District court denied remand as untimely and held Music forfeited the ability to challenge the removal; summary judgment followed in Arrowood’s favor.
- The central issue is whether the one-year removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is procedural (waivable) or jurisdictional (not waivable).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1446(b)’s one-year limit is procedural or jurisdictional. | Music contends one-year limit is jurisdictional and non-waivable. | Arrowood contends the limit is procedural and forfeitable for untimeliness. | One-year limit is procedural and forfeitable. |
| If procedural, whether Music forfeited his remand objection by not moving within 30 days. | Music argues the defect may be raised anytime before final judgment. | Arrowood relies on forfeiture for failure to timely move for remand. | Music forfeited the removal defect due to untimely remand motion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, 351 F.3d 611 (3d Cir. 2003) (one-year removal limit is not a jurisdictional defect)
- In re Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 104 F.3d 322 (11th Cir. 1997) (untimeliness of removal is procedural, not jurisdictional)
- Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff forfeits removal timeliness)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996) (one-year limit described as nonjurisdictional and waivable)
- Seaton v. Jabe, 992 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1993) (thirty-day removal timeliness is procedural)
- Lanier v. The American Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1988) (thirty-day requirement for removal procedural)
- Carpenter v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 109 F.2d 375 (6th Cir. 1940) (statutory removal limit confers a waivable privilege, not jurisdiction)
- Lovern v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1997) (note on one-year limit not addressing jurisdictional status)