Murray v. Cuomo
460 F.Supp.3d 430
S.D.N.Y.2020Background
- Plaintiff Scherie S. Murray, a Queens Republican, sought the Republican nomination for NY-14 in the June 23, 2020 primary and filed a designating petition on March 20, 2020 with 906 signatures.
- Governor Cuomo’s Executive Order 202.2 (March 14, 2020) shortened the signature-collection period and the Legislature ratified it, reducing the required signatures from 5% to 1.5% (from ~1,250 to 375) and moving filing deadlines.
- Two objectors challenged Murray’s petition; the NYC Board of Elections’ Clerk’s Report found no valid signatures and the Board adopted that finding at an April 21 hearing, citing among other defects that the signature gatherer was not a registered Republican as required by N.Y. Election Law.
- Murray litigated in Bronx Supreme Court (Article 16), raised constitutional claims there, lost, did not appeal, and then filed this federal suit seeking a TRO to compel inclusion on the ballot.
- The District Court held Rooker–Feldman inapplicable (injury not caused by the state-court judgment), left open that res judicata might bar the suit, applied Anderson–Burdick balancing to the merits, and denied the requested temporary restraining order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rooker–Feldman jurisdiction | Murray argues federal court can hear constitutional challenge to EO 202.2 and related law because injury stems from the state executive/legislature action, not the state-court judgment | Defendants contend the federal case attacks the state-court disposition and is therefore barred | Court: Rooker–Feldman does not bar this suit because the injury alleged was not caused by the state-court judgment (the state court merely ratified BOE action) |
| Res judicata (claim preclusion) | Murray contends Article 16 was not a proper forum for constitutional claims or that she should not be precluded | Defendants argue Murray raised the constitutional claims in state court and the state-court decision is an adjudication on the merits | Court: Did not resolve; observed New York law likely permits constitutional claims in Article 16 and res judicata may preclude relitigation—record incomplete to decide now |
| Likelihood of success (Anderson–Burdick balancing) | Murray argues EO 202.2’s shortening of collection time violated her rights to seek office and voters’ associational rights | Defendants point to significant reduction in signature threshold and the state’s compelling public-health interest in minimizing in-person contact plus interest in orderly elections | Court: Restrictions were reasonable and nondiscriminatory under Anderson–Burdick; not a severe burden, so Murray is not likely to clearly succeed on the merits |
| Irreparable harm / public interest / remedy | Murray says constitutional injury is irreparable and asks for mandatory injunction to place her name on the ballot | Defendants emphasize public-health imperatives, election-administration burdens, and independent statutory defects in Murray’s petition; adding her name would be disruptive and not narrowly tailored | Court: Presumed irreparable harm for purpose of motion but found public interest and practical considerations weigh strongly against the mandatory, status-quo-changing relief; TRO denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (limits Rooker–Feldman to federal suits seeking review of state-court judgments)
- Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639 (2d Cir. 2018) (articulates Second Circuit’s test for Rooker–Feldman applicability)
- Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (discusses injury-caused-by-state-judgment core requirement in Rooker–Feldman analysis)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (establishes balancing framework for election-law burdens)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (refines scrutiny levels for burdens on ballot access under Anderson balancing)
- Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009) (irreparable harm is the key prerequisite for injunctive relief)
- Connecticut Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. OSHA, 356 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (constitutional violations commonly treated as irreparable injury)