Murray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
1:16-cv-02129
N.D. OhioMay 30, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Nicole Murray applied for DIB and SSI alleging disability from August 27, 2011, due to cervical degenerative disc disease, chronic neck/back pain, depression, anxiety, and related conditions; ALJ denied benefits and Appeals Council denied review.
- Medical record shows cervical disc herniation at C5-6 with cord compression (2011 MRI), mostly conservative treatment (NSAIDs, home exercise, limited steroid injections), normal/near-normal neuro exams and EMG, and multiple ER visits without emergent findings.
- Mental-health records show recurrent moderate major depression, panic disorder, history of suicide attempts, sporadic medication compliance, participation in outpatient therapy and Magnolia Clubhouse activities with variable symptom control.
- Treating providers (Drs. Kea and Nagle‑Yang) completed checkbox medical source statements asserting severe physical and mental work restrictions; a consultative psychologist (Dr. House) opined significant workplace dysfunction; state consultants imposed moderate limits and found capacity for simple, low‑stress work.
- ALJ formulated an RFC for light work with physical limits (no hazards, limited climbing/stooping, occasional overhead reach) and mental limits (simple routine tasks, low‑stress, superficial coworker/supervisor contact, no public interaction), found Murray unable to perform past work but able to perform other work, and denied benefits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weight given to treating physicians' checkbox opinions | Murray: ALJ failed to give controlling weight and did not give "good reasons" for discounting treating MD (Dr. Kea) and psychiatrist (Dr. Nagle‑Yang) MSS forms | Commissioner: MSS forms were conclusory check‑boxes lacking explanations and inconsistent with objective findings and conservative treatment; ALJ permissibly discounted them | Held: ALJ provided adequate reasons — forms were weak, unsupported by objective findings, inconsistent with record, and ALJ permissibly declined to credit them |
| Handling consultative examiner (Dr. House) opinion that claimant "would probably not show up to work" | Murray: ALJ did not meaningfully address Dr. House’s statement that she would be dysfunctional and likely not attend work, requiring remand | Commissioner: Opinion is an ultimate-issue/lay conclusion on disability (reserved to SSA); ALJ reasonably gave little weight to vague prognosis and was not required to adopt the conclusory statement | Held: No remand required; ALJ need not credit ultimate-issue disability statement and was not required to adopt that portion of Dr. House’s opinion |
| Consideration of new evidence for Sentence Six remand | Murray: Two post‑decision letters (2015 Dr. Kea; Dr. Brown re: fibromyalgia) are new, material, and justify remand | Commissioner: Letters are cumulative, not materially different, and include ultimate-issue opinions reserved to Commissioner | Held: No Sentence Six remand — evidence is cumulative/not material and would not likely change outcome |
| Overall substantial‑evidence review and legal standards | Murray: ALJ misapplied treating‑physician rules and failed to build an adequate bridge from evidence to RFC | Commissioner: ALJ applied proper standards; RFC and credibility findings supported by conservative treatment, objective exams, and state‑agency opinions | Held: Substantial evidence supports ALJ’s findings and application of law; decision affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Rogers v. Commissioner of Social Security, 486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007) (defines substantial‑evidence review and standards for weighing evidence)
- Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2004) (treating‑physician rule and requirement to give good reasons when discounting treating source opinions)
- Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2013) (articulates factors and analysis for weighing medical opinion evidence)
- Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 1997) (burden of proof shifts at step five of sequential evaluation)
- Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1986) (substantial‑evidence standard and "zone of choice" discussion)