Murray Hooper v. Charles Ryan
729 F.3d 782
7th Cir.2013Background
- Murray Hooper was convicted in Illinois (three murders) after a 1981 trial; Illinois Supreme Court affirmed conviction but ordered a new penalty trial; death sentence later commuted to life; federal §2254 collateral review began in 2010.
- Hooper was tried before Judge Thomas J. Maloney, later convicted for taking bribes in related matters; co-defendants Bracy and Collins raised compensatory-bias claims leading to Bracy litigation.
- Hooper asserted three federal claims in district court: compensatory bias by the judge, exclusion of his confession, and Batson challenge to peremptory strikes that resulted in an all‑white jury.
- The state courts (including the Illinois Supreme Court) rejected Hooper’s Batson challenge after Judge Maloney held there was no prima facie case; the state court’s analysis relied on (1) a rule against inferring discrimination solely from disproportionate strikes, (2) comparison of numbers struck rather than venire composition, (3) factual/ legal assumptions about parties’ races, and (4) treating prosecutor explanations as dispositive.
- The Seventh Circuit found the state court unreasonable in applying Batson and its progeny to Hooper: statistical disparity plus the prosecutor’s failure to articulate any reason for at least one challenged black juror required a federal evidentiary hearing; the district court’s denial was vacated and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether compensatory‑bias by Judge Maloney warranted relief | Hooper: Maloney’s bribery and subsequent behavior show compensatory bias affecting fairness | State: No legally or factually sufficient showing of compensatory bias | Court: Agreed with district court and state courts — no reversible error on compensatory‑bias claim |
| Whether Hooper’s confession should have been excluded | Hooper: Confession was obtained unfairly and should be suppressed | State: Confession admissible; state courts reasonable in denial | Held: State courts’ decision was not shown unreasonable; no relief warranted |
| Whether prosecutor’s peremptory strikes violated Batson | Hooper: Struck every eligible black venire member (5 of 5), creating prima facie case requiring reasons and credibility testing | State: No prima facie case; prosecutor’s articulated race‑neutral reasons defeat inference of discrimination | Held: State court unreasonably applied Batson; statistical disparity, misapplied analysis, factual errors, and failure to articulate a reason for one strike require a federal evidentiary hearing |
| Whether later Batson elaborations (e.g., Miller‑El) apply on collateral review | Hooper: Later cases explain Batson and are applicable to evaluate his jury selection | State: Some later rules are new under Teague and inapplicable | Held: Miller‑El and similar decisions clarify Batson rather than create a new Teague‑barred rule; they inform the Batson analysis on collateral review |
Key Cases Cited
- Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (establishes compensatory‑bias theory and remand for inquiry)
- Bracy v. Schomig, 286 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. en banc decision on compensatory‑bias sufficiency)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibits race‑based peremptory strikes; framework for prima facie showing and burden shifting)
- Miller‑El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (endorses statistical analysis to establish prima facie Batson violations)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (single discriminatory peremptory strike can vitiate a conviction)
- Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (prior standard relying on systematic statistical proof)
- J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (extends Batson to sex discrimination)
- Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (Batson sequence and evaluation of prosecutor explanations)
- Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (context on proof methodologies for discrimination claims)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (limits on new‑rule retroactivity in collateral review)
- Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (new rules apply to cases on direct review at time of decision)
- Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (jurisdictional note on applicability of §2254 standards)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (limits on review of habeas claims and requirement for evidentiary hearing when appropriate)