Murphy v. United States
130 Fed. Cl. 554
| Fed. Cl. | 2017Background
- William A. Murphy, a GS-13 civilian Army employee, lived in Vicenza, Italy and received a Living Quarters Allowance (LQA) for a personally owned quarter (POQ) under Department of State Standardized Regulations (DSSR) §136(a).
- DSSR §136(a) provides a rental-equivalent LQA up to 10% of original purchase price, limited to a period not to exceed ten years; utilities continue thereafter.
- Murphy was reassigned to the U.S. in 2010 (LQA terminated), returned to Vicenza in June 2012, and the Army authorized an LQA effective June 18, 2012 to expire April 13, 2021.
- On November 27, 2013, the Army terminated the rental portion of Murphy’s LQA, asserting he had already exhausted the cumulative ten-year rental limit for that POQ. Murphy continued to receive utility payments.
- Murphy sought administrative relief (OPM denied an exception and reconsideration) and appealed to the MSPB (dismissed for lack of jurisdiction), then filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking reinstatement and retroactive rental LQA payments (~$34,000).
- The Government moved to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(6); the court examined payment records and an audit showing Murphy received the equivalent of ten years of rental LQA and granted the motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DSSR §136 allows restarting a new ten-year rental LQA period when an employee is reassigned back to a location and POQ previously used | Murphy: Transfer in 2012 started a new LQA grant under DSSR §132.11; the Army's Oct. 21, 2013 letter granting LQA (2012–2021) is controlling | Gov’t: DSSR §136 limits rental portion to a cumulative 10 years per POQ; Murphy already exhausted that period so no new rental LQA is owed | Court: Adopted Army’s interpretation; §136’s ten-year limit is cumulative and unambiguous—no restart on reassignment; dismissal granted |
| Whether the Army’s Oct. 21, 2013 letter created a binding right to additional rental LQA | Murphy: Letter authorized specific rental payments and dates; not rescinded | Gov’t: Letter is not a contract and cannot override regulatory limits; no consideration or authority to pay beyond regulation | Court: Letter cannot require payments contrary to regulation; agency not estopped from denying benefits not permitted by law |
| Whether court has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act based on a money‑mandating source | Murphy: DSSR and implementing DoD/Army regs create money-mandating entitlement for eligible class (he is GS-13 in Europe) | Gov’t: (implicitly) entitlement depends on correct regulatory interpretation | Court: Jurisdiction exists because DSSR + DoDI + Army reg can be money-mandating when they designate an eligible class; merits resolved against Murphy |
| Whether agency interpretation of DSSR warrants deference | Murphy: favors plaintiff interpretation restarting LQA on reassignment | Gov’t: Army’s reading (no restart) is reasonable and consistent with purpose (compensate purchase price over 10 years) | Court: Court defers to Army interpretation (Auer/agency deference) as not plainly erroneous or inconsistent; interpretation upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (Tucker Act requires separate money‑mandating source)
- Roberts v. United States, 745 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (regulations + implementing agency rules can be money‑mandating when they designate eligible class)
- Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (agency interpretation entitled to deference unless plainly erroneous)
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (deference to agency interpretation of its own regulation)
- Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (deference to implementing agency interpretations in appropriate contexts)
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (pro se pleadings held to less stringent standard)
- Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795 (pro se complaints’ failures not excused)
- Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. en banc) (Tucker Act requires money‑mandating source)
- Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746 (plaintiff bears burden to establish jurisdiction)