Murphy v. Murphy, 295 Ga. 376

Nancy and John Murphy divorced in 2006; in 2012 John sought to modify child custody.
Judge A. Quillian Baldwin denied Nancy Murphy's motion to disqualify him on June 7, 2012; Nancy filed a notice of appeal June 13, 2012.
Appeal was docketed in the Court of Appeals in September 2012; in May 2013 the General Assembly amended OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11) to narrow which child-custody orders are directly appealable.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Nancy's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning the 2013 amendment applied retroactively and the recusal order was no longer directly appealable.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the 2013 amendment applied retroactively to appeals filed before its enactment and whether the recusal order was appealable under the prior statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2013 amendment to OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11) applies to an appeal filed before the amendment's effective date	Murphy: appeal filed before amendment, so prior, broader statute governs and appeal is allowable	Court of Appeals/State: procedural statutes apply retroactively; amendment narrows appealability and therefore bars the appeal	Court: Procedural changes can be given retroactive effect, but that generally governs filings/proceedings occurring after the amendment; here the amendment does not retroactively strip appeals already filed. The retroactivity rationale does not justify dismissal.
Whether a trial-court recusal order is a directly appealable "order[] in child custody cases" under the pre-amendment OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(11)	Murphy: the recusal order was appealable as an "order in a child custody case" under the statute in effect when the appeal was filed	Court of Appeals/State: the amended narrower text excludes recusal orders; under either view the order may not be appealable	Court: Even under the pre-amendment text, recusal orders are not orders "regarding which parent has custody" and thus are not directly appealable; dismissal was warranted.

Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54 (Ga. 1988) (procedural statutes generally apply retroactively absent contrary intent)
Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 271 (Ga. 2008) (no vested right in procedure; presumption against retrospective construction doesn't apply to pure procedural changes)
Day v. Stokes, 268 Ga. 494 (Ga. 1997) (procedural changes govern appeals filed or judgments entered after the change; law at time of judgment/notice controls)
Crimminger v. Habif, 174 Ga. App. 440 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (right to appeal arises at judgment entry; appellate procedure in effect at judgment governs)
Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35 (Ga. 2012) (judicial change in law applies retroactively to cases in the pipeline)
Stevens v. State, 292 Ga. 218 (Ga. 2012) (applied Sosniak to dismiss an appeal filed before the new judicial interpretation)
Banks v. ICI Americas, 266 Ga. 607 (Ga. 1996) (distinguishes retroactivity rules for statutory/constitutional amendments from judicial decisions)
Edge v. Edge, 290 Ga. 551 (Ga. 2012) (pre-amendment § 5-6-34(a)(11) limited to orders deciding which parent has custody; recusal orders fall outside)
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1994) (framework for retroactive application of statutes)