Murphy v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
274 A.3d 412
Md.2022Background
- In March–July 2020 the Maryland Judiciary restricted in-person operations during the COVID‑19 state of emergency; clerks’ offices were closed March 16–July 20, 2020.
- The Court of Appeals promulgated emergency rules (Maryland Rule 16-1001 et seq.) authorizing the Chief Judge to suspend, toll, or extend statutory and rules deadlines during an emergency declared by the Governor.
- On April 3 and April 24, 2020 (and later amendments), the Chief Judge issued administrative orders tolling statutes of limitations and related filing deadlines for matters affected by the pandemic; the tolling period was tied to the courts’ closure.
- Liberty Mutual sued Murphy Enterprises in federal court (diversity) for indemnification; several bond‑related claims arguably accrued more than three years before suit, so federal jurisdiction depended on whether Maryland’s tolling order made those claims timely.
- Murphy argued the Chief Judge exceeded judicial authority and violated Article 8 (separation of powers) and Article 9 (prohibition on suspension of laws) of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; the federal court certified the question to the Maryland Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals held the Chief Judge acted within constitutional and rulemaking authority, and that the tolling order did not usurp another branch’s core functions nor violate Article 9.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Murphy) | Defendant's Argument (Liberty Mutual / Judiciary) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to toll statutes in an emergency | Chief Judge lacked power to toll statutory limitations; only Legislature may alter statutes of limitations | Chief Judge acted under Art. IV §18 and Rule 16-1003(a)(7) (adopted by Court of Appeals) authorizing suspension/tolling in declared emergencies | Held: Chief Judge had authority under the Court’s rulemaking power and her administrative role to issue the tolling order |
| Nature of tolling—procedural vs substantive | Tolling altered substantive legislative-created rights and thus exceeded judicial/rule authority | Tolling of filing deadlines is procedural (regulates remedy/method), within practice & procedure rulemaking authority | Held: Tolling is procedural; within the Court’s practice/procedure and administration powers |
| Separation of powers (Article 8) — usurpation | Order usurped Legislative authority to set limitation periods and Executive emergency functions | Order did not displace legislative policy—it temporarily adjusted procedural deadlines to address court access and mirrored Executive emergency measures; Judiciary coordinated with Executive and Legislature | Held: No usurpation; order fell within judicial administrative and rulemaking powers and did not encroach on core functions of other branches |
| Suspension of laws (Article 9) | Tolling amounted to an unconstitutional suspension of laws not derived from the Legislature | Specific constitutional grant of rulemaking/admin power to Judiciary and emergency rules control; tolling was consistent with emergency practice and legislative emergency delegations to Governor | Held: No Article 9 violation; specific constitutional grants and context prevail over a literal reading of Article 9 |
Key Cases Cited
- Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631 (1981) (articulating the discovery rule for accrual of causes of action)
- Whitaker v. Prince George’s County, 307 Md. 368 (1986) (Court’s rulemaking power includes internal administration of courts)
- Consolidated Construction Services, Inc. v. Simpson, 372 Md. 434 (2002) (Court exceeded rulemaking authority where a rule made substantive changes to statutory scheme)
- Hensley v. Bethesda Sheet Metal Co., 230 Md. 556 (1963) (interaction of court rules and statutes; last‑enacted provision prevails)
- McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272 (1997) (Article 8 preserves essential functions of each branch; prohibits usurpation)
- Linchester v. Department of Natural Resources, 274 Md. 211 (1975) (permissible delegation and limits under separation of powers)
- Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 394 Md. 227 (2006) (test and context for recognizing judicial tolling exceptions)
- Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services, LLC, 454 Md. 680 (2017) (statutes of limitations reflect legislative policy and are implemented by courts)
- Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683 (1981) (branches possess implied powers necessary to perform constitutional duties)
- Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Jackson concurrence on interdependence and limits among branches)