Murphy, H. v. Karnek, S.
160 A.3d 850
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- The "Scott Heirs' Farm" (surface + minerals originally) was owned by Joe and Bessie Krynovske; in 1938 Wrenshall conveyed the oil & gas to Bessie for life with remainder to Joe, leaving the surface/minerals otherwise affected.
- In 1939 Joe and Bessie conveyed the surface to John & Mary Pirih by a deed that contained an identical "excepting and reserving" oil-and-gas clause and stated the conveyance was "under and subject to" Wrenshall's 1938 deed to Bessie.
- Joe died intestate in 1959; under intestacy law his remainder interest in the oil & gas was divided such that Bessie acquired 1/3 of the remainder and each of Joe’s five children received equal shares of the rest.
- Bessie died testate in 1963; her will devised "all my real estate property" to daughter Helen and referenced royalties from seven wells on the Scott Heirs' Farm. The will contained no residuary clause.
- After a chain of deaths and transfers, the Murphy Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment asserting a split of oil-and-gas ownership (Murphys and one Karnek heir); the Karnek Defendants claimed 100% title via tenancy by the entireties and subsequent transfers. The trial court awarded 2/3 to Karnek Family Partners, 1/6 to Sidney Karneke, and 1/12 each to Harold and William Murphy. The Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Murphy's Argument | Karnek's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the Pirih Deed change the preexisting life estate (Bessie) and remainder (Joe) into a fee held by Joe and Bessie as tenants by the entireties? | Murphy: Pirih Deed did not alter Bessie's life estate or Joe's remainder; those interests remained as previously created. | Karnek: The Pirih Deed's "excepting and reserving" language (and use of the word "all") shows intent to vest "all" oil & gas in Joe and Bessie jointly (entireties). | Held: Deed language is "under and subject to" Wrenshall's deed; Pirih Deed excepted oil & gas but did not extinguish the earlier life estate/remainder. No tenancy by entireties created. |
| Was the Pirih clause a reservation to the Krynovskes (creating new interests) rather than an exception to the conveyance? | Murphy: It was an exception recognizing the preexisting life estate; no new interest created. | Karnek: Claimed the language effectuated a reservation to grantors, supporting entireties ownership. | Held: Because Bessie's life estate preexisted, the Pirih language operated as an exception (not a reservation) and did not create new ownership. |
| Does the "stranger in title" doctrine invalidate the Pirih Deed’s purported transfer/reservation to Bessie (a non-grantee)? | Murphy: Not applicable; the deed expressly references Wrenshall's earlier deed and recognizes the life estate. | Karnek: Suggested stranger-in-title concerns and urged examination of grantor intent. | Held: The stranger-in-title discussion is inapposite; the deed’s plain terms control and show the parties intended to preserve the Wrenshall-created life estate. |
| Did Bessie’s will devise her 1/3 interest in the oil & gas to Helen (despite the will’s specific description of a Canton Township lot and reference to royalties)? | Murphy: The will’s specific property description limits the devise to the house lot; royalties reference does not transfer underlying oil & gas; absent clear disposition, the 1/3 passes by intestacy to Bessie's children. | Karnek (and trial court): The general clause "all my real estate property" includes oil & gas (oil & gas are real property) and thus the 1/3 passed to Helen under the will. | Held: The court adopted the trial court: "all my real estate property" conveys Bessie's real-property interests (including her 1/3 oil & gas interest) to Helen; the specific lot description does not cut down the general devise. |
Key Cases Cited
- Shamis v. Moon, 81 A.3d 962 (Pa. Super. 2013) (summary judgment standard and review principles)
- Mackall v. Fleegle, 801 A.2d 577 (Pa. Super. 2002) (deed interpretation — primary objective is to ascertain parties' intent from the instrument)
- Brookbank v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 131 A.2d 103 (Pa. 1957) (deed-construction rules and principles)
- Ralston v. Ralston, 55 A.3d 736 (Pa. Super. 2012) (distinguishing reservation versus exception in deeds)
- Duquesne Nat. Gas Co. v. Fefolt, 198 A.2d 608 (Pa. Super. 1964) (oil and gas characterized as real property)
- In re Estate of McFadden, 100 A.3d 645 (Pa. Super. 2014) (will interpretation: testator intent is controlling)