Murillo-Robles v. Lynch
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18307
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- Petitioner Daniel Murillo-Robles, a Peruvian who became a conditional lawful resident as a child, faced removal after USCIS denied his family's I-751 petitions (2006 and 2009) due to attorney failures.
- Removal proceedings began in 2007; numerous continuances followed and multiple attorneys represented the petitioner; two attorneys provided ineffective assistance and one was later disbarred/suspended.
- A merits hearing was set for April 30, 2012 at 8:00 a.m.; petitioner arrived ~8:30 a.m. believing the hearing began at 9:00 a.m.; IJ entered an in absentia removal order at 8:19 a.m.
- The petitioner’s counsel at the hearing was told the IJ would consider a reopening motion if filed upon arrival, accepted payment to file a motion, but failed to file it; counsel’s license was later suspended for neglect.
- Petitioner moved to reopen in July 2015; the IJ excused the untimely filing due to ineffective assistance but found no "exceptional circumstances" to rescind the in absentia order; the BIA affirmed. The petitioner sought judicial review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "exceptional circumstances" justified rescission of an in absentia removal order | Murillo-Robles: ineffective assistance plus only minor tardiness converted into removal; totality of circumstances warrants reopening | Government: notice was clear; tardiness not excused; no exceptional circumstances shown | Court: BIA abused discretion—failed to weigh counsel’s role and minor tardiness; remand to set aside in absentia order and reopen |
| Whether ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute an exceptional circumstance | Murillo-Robles: counsel’s failure to notify IJ or to file the promised motion prejudiced his opportunity to be heard | Government: the late arrival itself, not counsel, was dispositive given clear notice | Court: ineffective assistance may be exceptional; here counsel’s failures materially contributed and warranted weight in totality analysis |
| Whether minor tardiness should be equated with failure to appear | Murillo-Robles: 30-minute delay amid history of timely appearances is minor and should be excused | Government: notice showed 8:00 a.m.; absence at call supports in absentia order | Court: BIA erred by not distinguishing minor tardiness from total nonappearance; tardiness should be given weight |
| Whether the BIA abused discretion in denying reopening under totality-of-circumstances | Murillo-Robles: cumulative attorney errors, strength of underlying claim, and lack of intent to delay justify reopening | Government: procedural rules and clear notice support denial | Court: BIA neglected salient factors and misweighed them; abused discretion; remand with instructions to reopen |
Key Cases Cited
- Wan v. Holder, 776 F.3d 52 (1st Cir.) (discussing review of BIA decisions)
- Carter v. INS, 90 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.) (BIA has broad but not unlimited discretion)
- Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (ways BIA may abuse discretion)
- White v. INS, 17 F.3d 475 (1st Cir.) (improper consideration of factors may constitute abuse)
- Vaz Dos Reis v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (ineffective assistance can be an exceptional circumstance)
- Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21 (1st Cir.) (ineffective assistance standard in removal proceedings)
- Jerezano v. INS, 169 F.3d 613 (9th Cir.) (courts typically give tardy litigants another chance)
- Kaweesa v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 62 (1st Cir.) (totality-of-circumstances and strength of underlying claim considerations)
- Herbert v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 68 (1st Cir.) (exceptional-circumstances standard aims to prevent strategic absences)
- Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770 (9th Cir.) (tardiness treated as nonappearance in some circuits)
- Abu Hasirah v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 478 F.3d 474 (2d Cir.) (tardiness treated as nonappearance)
- Cabrera-Perez v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.) (same)
- Alarcon-Chavez v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 343 (5th Cir.) (same)
- Charuc v. Holder, 737 F.3d 113 (1st Cir.) (BIA's sua sponte reopening authority is unreviewable)
