708 F. App'x 48
3rd Cir.2017Background
- Muriel Collins, an African-American Kimberly-Clark employee and shop steward, refused to honor a subpoena to testify at a co-worker’s arbitration and was suspended five days for insubordination.
- Collins filed grievances and alleged she was asked to commit perjury and discriminated against; an HR investigation concluded the subpoena and arbitration conduct were proper but that Collins provided false/conflicting information during the investigation.
- For lying in the investigation Collins received a 15-day suspension, demotion (one pay level), and a Last Chance Agreement; she later used company-wide emails and safety reports to press her claims and was terminated for violating the Last Chance Agreement by disrupting the workplace.
- Collins sued under Title VII and § 1981 alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation; Kimberly-Clark moved for summary judgment after discovery and the District Court granted it.
- On appeal (Collins pro se), the Third Circuit limited review to the Title VII/§ 1981 claims raised below and affirmed summary judgment, finding Collins failed to show prima facie discrimination or retaliation and that termination was not pretextual.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Discrimination (suspension for refusing subpoena) | Collins: subpoena/discipline motivated by race/sex | Kimberly-Clark: suspension for refusal to obey subpoena; no discriminatory motive or comparator evidence | No prima facie case; affirmed |
| Discrimination (15-day suspension, demotion, pay cut, Last Chance) | Collins: white males received lesser discipline for comparable misconduct | Kimberly-Clark: misconduct not comparable (lying in investigation vs. internet misuse); discipline justified by Code of Conduct violation | No sufficient comparators; no inference of discrimination; affirmed |
| Retaliation (discipline and demotion after complaints/EEOC charges) | Collins: adverse actions were retaliation for protected activity | Kimberly-Clark: discipline and termination were for disruptive/unfounded allegations and lying, not retaliation; temporal and other evidence insufficient | No prima facie retaliation; termination not shown to be pretext for retaliation; affirmed |
| § 1981 Retaliation | Collins: § 1981 claim mirrors Title VII retaliation | Kimberly-Clark: same defenses; no triable issue | § 1981 claim fails for same reasons as Title VII; affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden-shifting framework)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (standard for genuine issue of material fact)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (nonmoving party must present evidence that could lead a rational trier of fact to find for it)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (prima facie framework for discrimination cases)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (elements of prima facie discrimination)
- Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (employer burden and rebuttal in discrimination cases)
- LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (temporal proximity and causation in retaliation claims)
- Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 2517 ("but-for" causation standard for retaliation at pretext stage)
- Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331 (elements of retaliation claim)
- Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271 (scope of evidence needed to infer causation in retaliation)
- Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173 (de novo review of summary judgment)