Munywe v. Peters
3:21-cv-05431
W.D. Wash.Feb 13, 2023Background
- Plaintiff Michael M. Munywe (pro se, incarcerated) was arrested Nov. 21–22, 2018 on suspicion of raping a 15-year-old; he was later convicted of second-degree rape and unlawful imprisonment.
- Detectives Muse (male) and Dier (female) obtained a search warrant authorizing a search of Munywe’s person and clothing and collection of DNA; the warrant was issued in the early morning hours.
- Crime scene technician Malerie Ramos (female) — the only technician on duty — photographed and briefly had Munywe lower his underwear twice (one photo with face excluded) and performed a quick penile swab; Muse and Dier were present but did not touch him.
- Munywe sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging: an unreasonable cross-gender search (Fourth Amendment); coerced/confiscated statements (Fifth Amendment); disparate/punitive treatment (Fourteenth Amendment); and a Monell claim against the City of Tacoma for policy/custom failures.
- Magistrate Judge Creatura recommended granting defendants’ summary judgment; Judge Rothstein adopted the R&R, granted summary judgment for defendants, dismissed all claims with prejudice, and denied IFP status for appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fourth Amendment: cross-gender search/strip-search reasonableness | Munywe says being exposed to female technicians/detectives humiliated him and was unnecessary and punitive despite the warrant. | Search was authorized by a warrant; exigent evidence-preservation concerns and only a female tech was available; search was brief and respectful. | Court: Search reasonable; exigent circumstances and limited intrusion justified cross-gender evidence collection; no Fourth Amendment violation. |
| Fifth Amendment: compelled self-incrimination | Munywe contends the cross-gender search/interrogation coerced statements later used at trial. | No coerced or compelled confession occurred; Munywe did not admit sexual contact and interview was not coercive. | Court: No Fifth Amendment violation — Munywe made no compelled confession and interview was not coercive. |
| Fourteenth Amendment: disparate treatment / discrimination | Munywe alleges treatment based on accent, race, or national origin (comments about accent/Africa). | Investigators questioned accent to ensure comprehension; record lacks evidence of intentional discrimination. | Court: No evidence of purposeful discrimination; Fourteenth Amendment claim fails. |
| Monell: municipal liability for customs/policies | Munywe faults Tacoma’s policies or training for enabling the violations. | Municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation or proof of a municipal policy/custom that caused injury. | Court: Monell fails because no individual constitutional violation shown and no evidence of an unconstitutional policy or custom. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (reasonableness of searches in detention balances intrusion against governmental need)
- Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires a policy or custom causing a constitutional violation)
- Byrd v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (cross-gender strip searches may violate the Fourth Amendment absent exigent circumstances)
- York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) (recognizing bodily privacy interest from observation by opposite sex)
- Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1991) (emergency/exigent circumstances can justify cross-gender viewing/searches)
- Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999) (female officers’ presence during urgent searches did not violate Fourth Amendment)
- Chavez v. Robinson, 12 F.4th 978 (9th Cir. 2021) (Fifth Amendment self-incrimination applies only where compelled statements are used against a defendant)
- Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (Monell requires identification of municipal policy or custom causing injury)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard: nonmoving party must present probative evidence)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (nonmoving party cannot rely on metaphysical doubt to defeat summary judgment)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (moving party need only show absence of evidence for nonmoving party’s case)
