760 F.Supp.3d 28
S.D.N.Y.2024Background
- Plaintiff Ayana Mumin, a practicing Muslim and former NYC DOC Captain, refused COVID-19 vaccination and sought a religious accommodation (Accommodation Form submitted Oct 22, 2021); DOC denied the request (Nov 10, 2021) citing undue hardship and direct-threat/staffing concerns.
- DOC teletype stated the only allowable accommodation (if granted) would be weekly PCR testing; Mumin performed weekly testing while on duty but appeal was denied and she was placed on leave without pay (Jan 2, 2022) and later terminated; she lost pay/benefits.
- Mumin alleges DOC routinely granted medical but denied all religious accommodations, and that male employees were allowed to remain unvaccinated while unvaccinated female employees were terminated; she names Commissioner Louis Molina and Salesforce (which transmitted appeal notices) as defendants.
- Claims pleaded: Title VII, NYSHRL, NYCHRL (religion and gender discrimination; failure to accommodate); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985; EEOC right-to-sue letters issued for City and Salesforce.
- City Defendants and Salesforce moved to dismiss; Court treated denial letter, teletype, and Salesforce email as incorporated; Court dismissed all claims but granted Mumin leave to amend (Third Amended Complaint due Jan 15, 2025).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mumin) | Defendant's Argument (City / Salesforce) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Title VII failure-to-accommodate (religion) | Mumin sincerely holds religious objection to vaccination, requested weekly testing, was disciplined/terminated for refusal | City: granting accommodation would cause undue hardship/direct threat given confined facilities, staffing shortages; denial letter supports that conclusion | Dismissed — court finds undue-hardship defense apparent on face of complaint (denial letter/teletype); accommodation plausibly would have imposed undue hardship on DOC |
| 2) Title VII disparate-treatment (religion) | DOC granted medical but denied religious accommodations; Mumin and one other captain denied | City: allegations are conclusory, lack similarly situated comparators and factual detail | Dismissed — complaint fails to plead specific comparators or factual detail to raise plausible inference of religious discrimination |
| 3) Gender discrimination (Title VII, NYSHRL, NYCHRL) | DOC treated male employees more favorably (allowed some unvaccinated males to work) while disciplining/terminating female employees like Mumin | City: allegations conclusory; proposed male comparators not shown to be similarly situated; no other evidence of discriminatory intent | Dismissed — inadequate factual allegations and lack of similarly situated comparators; NYSHRL/NYCHRL claims also fail despite more liberal construction |
| 4) Monell claim / §1983 against Molina (official capacity) — policy/custom | Mumin alleges DOC policy/practice (per Molina) denying religious accommodations and favoring male employees | City: no formal policy to deny religion-based accommodations; two instances insufficient to show widespread/custom; no alleged final policymaker action or failure-to-train pleaded | Dismissed — Monell liability not plausibly alleged (no formal policy, insufficient pattern/examples, no allegation Molina had final policymaking authority) |
| 5) §1983 against Molina (individual capacity) — personal involvement & qualified immunity | Molina instructed policy or directed denials and thus personally involved | City: no allegations Molina personally decided or reviewed Mumin’s appeal; even if involved, qualified immunity applies | Dismissed — no personal involvement pleaded; qualified immunity would protect Molina on due process and equal protection theories |
| 6) Claims against Salesforce — employer / state actor / §1985 conspiracy | Salesforce transmitted appeal messages and (allegedly) reviewed/decided appeals; thus joint employer and/or acted under color of state law and conspired with City to discriminate | Salesforce: did not hire/supervise/pay Mumin; merely provided portal/notifications; incorporated email shows appeal decision was by City/Appeals Panel, not Salesforce | Dismissed — Salesforce not a joint employer (no control over employment terms); no state action close-nexus shown; §1985 claim fails because it merely repleads employment-discrimination theory barred as standalone §1985 theory |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard requires factual matter rendering claim plausible)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must do more than allege conceivable wrongdoing)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy, custom, or deliberate indifference)
- Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023) (undue-hardship inquiry for religious accommodations requires assessing substantial burden in overall employer context)
- New Yorkers for Religious Liberty, Inc. v. City of New York, 121 F.4th 448 (2d Cir. 2024) (affirmed dismissal where complaint failed to refute employer’s undue-hardship rationale)
- Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609 (2d Cir. 2020) (individual §1983 liability requires personal involvement in constitutional violation)
- Felder v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 27 F.4th 834 (2d Cir. 2022) (joint-employer inquiry: multi-factor control test for Title VII liability)
- Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2002) (employer must reasonably accommodate known sincere religious beliefs unless undue hardship)