MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND v. MACKEY, 406 P.3d 564

Background

Jolid Mackey had multiple prior adjudications of disability (including right arm/hand, lungs, both hands) and suffered a later work-related left-shoulder injury in Feb. 2013.
The Workers' Compensation Court of Existing Claims found Mackey was a "physically impaired person" under 85 O.S.2011 § 402(A)(4) and that the combination of his prior adjudications and the 2013 left-shoulder injury produced permanent total disability (PTD), awarding MITF liability.
MITF appealed; the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals vacated the award, reading the § 402(A)(4) proviso to require that any prior adjudication used to establish "physically impaired" status be to the same body part as the last injury.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the meaning and effect of the proviso in § 402(A)(4).
The Supreme Court held the proviso does not alter the jurisdictional definition of "physically impaired person," but rather limits when a Crumby (preexisting) finding may be combined with last-injury disability for MITF liability — allowing combination only if the Crumby disability is in the same body part as the last injury.
Applying that construction, the Supreme Court sustained the trial court's award: Mackey could be permanently totally disabled more than once and his prior adjudications could be combined with the 2013 shoulder injury to reach PTD.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Mackey)	Defendant's Argument (MITF)	Held
Does the § 402(A)(4) proviso limit who qualifies as a "physically impaired person" for MITF jurisdiction?	The proviso is not jurisdictional; §402(A)(4) still admits prior adjudications to qualify someone as physically impaired.	The proviso conditions the jurisdictional definition — prior adjudications qualify only if to the same body part as the last injury.	The Court held the proviso does not change the jurisdictional definition; it addresses combinability of Crumby findings for liability.
May a claimant previously adjudicated PTD obtain a later PTD award from MITF for a subsequent injury?	A claimant can be permanently totally disabled more than once if separate injuries occur; prior PTD adjudication does not bar later PTD absent return-to-work.	MITF argued prior PTD was final and should preclude duplicative MITF liability.	The Court held a claimant may sustain PTD more than once; prior adjudication is not conclusive on current disability.
Does the proviso permit combining Crumby (contemporaneous) findings with the last-injury disability for MITF liability?	Proviso permits limited combination: a Crumby finding may be combined only if it concerns the same body part injured in the last claim.	MITF argued combining prior adjudications already compensated by MITF is impermissible or should be restricted.	The Court held the proviso allows Crumby findings to be combined with last-injury disability only when they concern the same body part; proviso affects combinability, not jurisdiction.

Key Cases Cited

Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Wade, 180 P.3d 1205 (Okla. 2008) (adjudication of last injury must precede MITF recovery; discusses subtraction of preexisting disability)
Ball v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 360 P.3d 499 (Okla. 2015) (Legislature intended to limit Fund's liability; Crumby findings do not qualify as prior adjudications for jurisdictional purposes)
J.C. Penney Co. v. Crumby, 584 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1978) (origin of "Crumby" subtraction — preexisting disability offset to employer liability)
Special Indemnity Fund v. Doughty, 558 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1976) (prior adjudication of permanent disability is not conclusive on extent of disability at later time)
Special Indemnity Fund v. Betterton, 925 P.2d 86 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996) (claimant may be permanently totally disabled more than once from separate injuries)
Special Indemnity Fund v. Carson, 852 P.2d 157 (Okla. 1993) (Crumby finding is contemporaneous and not a "previous adjudication" for jurisdictional purposes)
Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Sugg, 362 P.3d 222 (Okla. 2015) (discusses scope of Fund liability and interplay of statutory provisions)