Mullins v. State, 299 Ga. 681

On March 8, 2009 Marcus Rashad Mullins shot and killed Damien Daniels outside a DeKalb County house party; Daniels was shirtless, intoxicated, and unarmed when shot five times.
Multiple eyewitnesses testified to two encounters: an initial confrontation in which Mullins allegedly brandished a gun, and a second where Mullins drove up, said “I’m going to get him,” and fired while positioned with one foot out of the car.
Mullins gave a recorded statement admitting he possessed a 9mm Hi-Point handgun, retrieved it after the interview, and said he shot because Daniels had earlier threatened to get his “tool.” Ballistics matched a 9mm from Mullins’ gun.
A jury convicted Mullins of felony murder (aggravated assault) and firearm possession; he received life plus consecutive five years. Trial court denied post-trial motions.
On appeal Mullins challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence, (2) exclusion of Chandler evidence (evidence of victim’s prior violent act), (3) effectiveness of counsel regarding jury charges, and (4) a particular self-defense jury charge phrase concerning provocation/being aggressor.

Issue	State's Argument	Mullins' Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to support convictions	Evidence (eyewitnesses, confession, ballistics) authorized conviction beyond a reasonable doubt	Evidence conflicted; defenses raised at trial	Affirmed — evidence sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia to uphold convictions
Exclusion of Chandler evidence (victim’s prior drive-by)	Evidence of victim’s prior violent act irrelevant to justification here; appellant failed prima facie showing	Chandler evidence showed victim’s propensity for violence and supported self‑defense claim	Affirmed — trial court properly excluded; Mullins failed to make prima facie showing that Daniels was aggressor or assaulted Mullins at time of shooting
Ineffective assistance for counsel failing to object to/withdraw certain justification/self-defense charges	Defense requested those charges; no deficient performance	Counsel’s charging decisions undermined defense; omission prejudicial	Denied — no deficient performance; requesting charges was trial strategy and counsel objected where appropriate
Jury instruction language (provocation/initial aggressor clause from OCGA §16-3-21(b)(2))	Clause applicable because evidence showed Mullins provoked or committed aggravated assault by earlier brandishing and words	Clause was surplusage, confusing, and improperly applied given facts (no intervening interlude)	Included clause was error but harmless given Mullins’ admissions and undisputed facts; conviction stands

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of evidence)
Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402 (admissibility framework for prior violent acts to show justification)
Cloud v. State, 290 Ga. 193 (requirements for prima facie showing for Chandler evidence)
Milner v. State, 281 Ga. 612 (Chandler testimony must show victim was aggressor and defendant honestly defending)
Graham v. State, 274 Ga. 696 (defendant’s belief victim was armed insufficient to show victim was aggressor for Chandler)
Collier v. State, 288 Ga. 756 (verbal threats and fisticuffs do not justify deadly force)
Felder v. State, 273 Ga. 844 (threats and a swing insufficient to justify deadly force against unarmed victim)
Walden v. State, 267 Ga. 162 (aggressive behavior alone does not establish assault for self‑defense)
Harrison v. State, 268 Ga. 574 (prior hitting minutes earlier insufficient to show victim was aggressor for Chandler)
Pullin v. State, 257 Ga. 815 (discussion of pattern charge language on provocation/initial aggressor)
MCG Health, Inc. v. Owners Ins. Co., 288 Ga. 782 ("right for any reason" rule used to affirm evidentiary exclusion)
Jessie v. State, 294 Ga. 375 (trial strategy in jury-charge decisions not basis for ineffective assistance)