196 Conn.App. 636
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background
- Defendant Kevin Hammons executed a mortgage; loan went into default and an EMAP notice was mailed by the servicer on April 3, 2014.
- Fannie Mae (the then-mortgagee) filed a foreclosure (based on that mortgage) but that action was dismissed for failure to prosecute on August 8, 2017.
- Fannie Mae assigned the mortgage to MTGLQ on June 28, 2017; MTGLQ then commenced a new foreclosure on November 24, 2017 and did not mail a fresh EMAP notice.
- MTGLQ moved for summary judgment relying exclusively on the April 3, 2014 EMAP notice sent before the Fannie Mae action; the trial court granted summary judgment and entered a judgment of strict foreclosure.
- On appeal the court held that MTGLQ’s failure to mail the required EMAP notice as the original plaintiff in the present action deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and reversed with direction to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the EMAP notice requirement (§ 8-265ee(a)) is a condition precedent that implicates subject matter jurisdiction | MTGLQ relied on the earlier EMAP notice sent by Fannie Mae and did not contest reliance on that notice to satisfy the statute | Hammons argued that § 8-265ee(a) must be satisfied by the mortgagee who commences the foreclosure and that failure deprives the court of jurisdiction | Court held § 8-265ee(a) is a jurisdictional condition precedent; failure to mail the notice by the initiating mortgagee deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction |
| Whether a prior mortgagee’s EMAP notice (sent before a dismissed foreclosure) satisfies the mailing requirement for a later, different mortgagee who commences a new foreclosure | MTGLQ argued the April 3, 2014 notice mailed by Fannie Mae sufficed despite assignment and the intervening dismissal | Hammons argued MTGLQ, as the original plaintiff in the new action, needed to mail the EMAP notice itself before commencing foreclosure | Court held the later mortgagee cannot import a prior mortgagee’s EMAP notice sent in a separate action; the initiating mortgagee must mail the notice. (If the plaintiff had been substituted into the prior action, the result could differ.) |
Key Cases Cited
- Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724 (1989) (certain statutory notice requirements can be jurisdictional conditions precedent)
- Gonzalez v. O & G Industries, Inc., 322 Conn. 291 (2016) (statutory interpretation principles; start with text and context)
- Machado v. Taylor, 326 Conn. 396 (2017) (once lack of jurisdiction is raised, the court must resolve it regardless of procedural vehicle)
- Peters v. Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434 (2005) (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived)
- Washington Mutual Bank v. Coughlin, 168 Conn. App. 278 (2016) (EMAP notice obligation applies only to mortgages meeting § 8-265ff(e) criteria)
- Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, 194 Conn. App. 843 (2019) (plenary review of statutory interpretation issues)