502 S.W.3d 102
Tenn.2016Background
- In 2013 defendant William E. Arnold was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child; convictions were affirmed on appeal and cert. was denied.
- Prior to indictment the victim’s mother, Ms. Bowen, filed a civil suit (on behalf of the minor) against Arnold and several organizations alleging sexual abuse and negligence.
- After criminal convictions became final, Bowen moved for partial summary judgment in the civil case, arguing collateral estoppel barred Arnold from contesting that he raped and sexually battered the child.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment, finding the issue was actually litigated and decided in the criminal case and that the victim (John Doe N) was in privity with the State for collateral-estoppel purposes.
- Arnold opposed, asserting mutuality/privity was lacking, his maintained innocence created a factual dispute, and criminal and civil proceedings are distinct; he sought interlocutory review.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review and held that Tennessee should abandon the strict party-mutuality requirement and adopt Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 29 and 85 guidelines; it affirmed the trial court’s partial summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars defendant from relitigating in civil court whether he raped and sexually battered the minor based on his criminal conviction | Bowen: Criminal convictions are preclusive and victim cannot be required to relitigate; mutuality should not block preclusion or the victim is in privity with the State | Arnold: Mutuality/privity lacking because victim was not a party to criminal case; criminal and civil proceedings differ; affidavit of innocence creates factual dispute | Court: Abolished strict mutuality; adopted Restatement (Second) §§ 29 and 85; applied factors and held collateral estoppel bars Arnold from relitigating that fact in the civil suit (partial SJ affirmed) |
| Whether Tennessee should retain the strict party-mutuality requirement for offensive and defensive collateral estoppel | Bowen: Mutuality should be abolished (or at least relaxed for victim suing convicted defendant) | Arnold: Mutuality is required; without it preclusion is unfair | Court: Abolished strict party-mutuality for both offensive and defensive collateral estoppel and directed courts to use Restatement §29 factors |
| Whether a criminal conviction is a proper basis for offensive collateral estoppel in subsequent civil litigation by the victim | Bowen: Criminal conviction entitled to preclusive effect; numerous safeguards in criminal trial support preclusion | Arnold: Criminal trial differs procedurally; conviction alone should not preclude civil litigation; risk of unfairness | Court: Adopted Restatement §85 — a prosecutorial judgment can be preclusive against the convicted defendant in later civil suits when §29/§28 factors do not warrant relitigation |
| Whether Arnold had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in criminal proceedings | Bowen: Yes—criminal trial offered greater procedural protections and appellate review | Arnold: He maintained innocence; affidavit creates triable issue | Court: Found Arnold had full and fair opportunity (trial, counsel, appeal) and no §28/§29 factors justified relitigation |
Key Cases Cited
- Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (U.S. 1971) (abolished mutuality for defensive collateral estoppel)
- Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (U.S. 1979) (permitted nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel and recommended trial-court discretion)
- Mullins v. State, 294 S.W.3d 529 (Tenn. 2009) (describes Tennessee collateral estoppel elements and burden)
- State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 650 (Tenn. 2005) (limits use of offensive collateral estoppel by prosecution in criminal context)
- Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1962) (explains rationale for giving criminal convictions preclusive effect in later civil actions)
- Hopps v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 506 A.2d 294 (N.H. 1985) (supports stronger rationale for applying collateral estoppel against convicted defendants)