Mr. Dee's Inc. v. Inmar, Inc., 127 F.4th 925

Plaintiffs (Mr. Dee’s Inc., Retail Marketing Services, Inc., and Connecticut Food Association) are purchasers of coupon processing services, alleging an anticompetitive conspiracy by Inmar, Inc. and subsidiaries to inflate coupon processing fees.
The alleged conspiracy involved horizontal price-fixing between Inmar and International Outsourcing Services, LLC (IOS), spanning 2001-2007.
Plaintiffs sought class certification for manufacturer and retailer purchasers; district court only certified the retailer class, denying all three definitions of the manufacturer class.
The district court’s rejections were based on failings related to fail-safe classes, ascertainability, predominance of common issues, and the inclusion of uninjured class members.
Plaintiffs appealed the denial of manufacturer class certification under Rule 23, prompting review by the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denials, finding no abuse of discretion in its application of Rule 23.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Fixed List Class definition is permittable under Rule 23	Plaintiffs argued that referencing a list of manufacturers (Appendix A) suffices and is not a fail-safe class.	Inmar argued the definition was impermissibly fail-safe and insufficient under Rule 23.	The court held that merely submitting a list fails to meet Rule 23’s requirements; denied certification.
Whether the Limited Payer Class is ascertainable and appropriate	Plaintiffs argued that cutoffs (months/volume) identify a natural, injured group.	Inmar contended the cutoffs arbitrarily exclude many allegedly injured manufacturers, untethered from harm.	The court found the class definition untethered from the alleged harm, failing ascertainability and superiority.
Whether the All Payer Class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3) predominance	Plaintiffs claimed predominance despite 32% uninjured members, challenging the requirement for universal injury evidence.	Inmar noted nearly one-third of class members showed no injury via plaintiffs’ own expert, defeating predominance.	The court ruled lack of predominance and standing due to a high share of uninjured members; denied certification.
Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying class certification	Plaintiffs argued improper application of Rule 23 and abuse of discretion.	Inmar argued district courts have broad discretion and accurately applied Rule 23.	The court found no abuse of discretion, affirming all denials.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (class certification requires affirmative demonstration of Rule 23 compliance)
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (rigorous analysis required for predominance and damages models in class certification)
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (class action as an exception to litigation by individual named parties)
Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643 (district courts have considerable latitude in complex class litigation)
Lienhart v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (district courts have broad discretion in class certification)
EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (class ascertainability and rigorous analysis for Rule 23)