Mphj Technology Investments v. Ricoh Americas Corporation
847 F.3d 1363
| Fed. Cir. | 2017Background
- The patent: U.S. Patent No. 8,488,173 (the ’173 Patent) claims a "Virtual Copier" (VC) that enables scanning and "seamless" replication/transmission of electronic images/documents to multiple external destinations via a single "Go" button or software integration.
- Proceeding: Petitioner (Ricoh, Xerox, Lexmark) instituted an IPR challenging claims 1–8 as anticipated and/or obvious; PTAB found claims 1–8 unpatentable.
- Representative claims: Claim 1 (system) and Claim 4 (method) require a network-addressable scanner/MFP capable of rendering in response to selection of a Go button, interface protocols including for email, and seamless replication/transmission to multiple destinations.
- Claim construction dispute: MPHJ argued that "Go button" and "interfacing" require a single-step, no-user-intervention transfer (automatic rendering + transmission); PTAB construed terms broadly to permit multi-step or indirect processes (including manual steps).
- PTAB findings: On the Board’s construction, PTAB found claims anticipated by Xerox XNS (and related GIS 150) and by Harkins, and alternatively obvious over Harkins combined with Motoyama.
- Appeal result: Federal Circuit majority affirmed PTAB’s invalidity determination under the Board’s constructions; Judge O’Malley concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing narrower construction should exclude some anticipatory findings.
Issues
| Issue | MPHJ’s Argument | Petitioner / PTAB Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper claim construction of "Go button" (single-step/no user intervention?) | "Go button" is a one-step operation that requires no further user action to render and transmit (single-step automatic transfer). | "Go button" means an operation that begins a process; claims permit separate steps and human or machine intervention. | Broadest reasonable construction (consistent with spec/prosecution) does not limit to single-step; PTAB construction affirmed. |
| Proper construction of "interfacing" (direct single-step connection to email?) | "Interfacing" requires direct connection enabling direct exchange without intervening manual steps. | "Interfacing" can be direct or indirect; indirect connections (including intermediate storage/manual steps) fall within claim scope. | PTAB construction (direct or indirect connection) affirmed. |
| Anticipation by Xerox XNS / GIS 150 | MPHJ: XNS does not disclose single-step scan-to-email; only multi-step drag/drop workflow. | Petitioner: XNS/GIS 150 disclose scanning, sending to file/print services, and distribution (including email) such that claims are anticipated under PTAB construction. | Substantial evidence supports PTAB that XNS (with GIS 150) anticipates claims as construed by PTAB; affirmed for applicable claims. |
| Anticipation by Harkins and obviousness (Harkins ± Motoyama) | MPHJ: Harkins uses drag-and-drop and intermediate storage, so it does not meet single-step "Go" or "interfacing" limitations. | Petitioner: Harkins discloses networked distribution, profiles, and interfaces that satisfy claim elements; Motoyama supplies protocol storage for obviousness combination. | PTAB’s findings of anticipation by Harkins and alternative obviousness (Harkins + Motoyama) sustained by majority; concurrence would reverse some of these holdings under narrower constructions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.) (claims must be construed to determine subject matter of patent validity analysis)
- Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (U.S.) (IPR claim construction uses the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with specification)
- Trs. of Columbia Univ. in New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir.) (provisional application can guide claim construction)
- Vederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., 744 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir.) (same on using provisional for claim construction)
- In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir.) (standard of review: factual findings for substantial evidence, legal conclusions de novo)
- In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.) (definition of substantial evidence)
- In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir.) (substantial-evidence standard explained)
- Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.) (lexicography/disavowal require clear intent)
- GE Lighting Sols., LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir.) (exacting standards for lexicography/disavowal)
- SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir.) (specification can disclaim claim scope)
- In re Johnston, 435 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir.) (optional elements generally do not narrow claims)
- Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029 (Fed. Cir.) (when a wherein/whereby clause limits a claim)
- Tex. Instruments Inc. v. ITC, 988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir.) (whereby/wherein result-only clauses add nothing if they merely state outcomes)
- Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir.) (anticipation factual; obviousness legal with underlying facts)
- Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Imps. Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085 (Fed. Cir.) (what prior art discloses is factual for anticipation)