Mount Hope Church v. Bash Back!
705 F.3d 418
| 9th Cir. | 2012Background
- Mount Hope sued Bash Back! and others in the Western District of Michigan under 18 U.S.C. § 248 and common law trespass seeking an injunction.
- Mount Hope sought seven anonymous Riseup email accounts via a subpoena duces tecum issued through the Western District of Washington; the subpoena listed limited data like account holder names, creation dates, IPs, and identifying information, but not email content.
- Riseup and one account holder, dkwatt, opposed the motion to compel; the district court quashed the subpoena and denied the motion to compel after First Amendment balancing.
- Mount Hope was sanctioned under Rule 45(c)(1) for alleged unduly burdensome conduct in issuing the subpoena, with fees awarded to Riseup and dkwatt.
- The district court applied a hybrid balancing approach (SaleHoo and themart.com standards) due to uncertainty whether the information pertained to defendants or witnesses.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding Rule 45(c)(1) sanctions require a showing of undue burden from compliance, facial defect, or bad faith; advocacy in good faith is not sanctionable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May Rule 45(c)(1) sanctions be awarded where subpoena is narrowly tailored and good-faith advocacy is pursued? | Mount Hope argues sanctions are warranted for undue burden and bad faith shortcomings under Rule 45(c)(1). | Riseup/dkwatt contend the subpoena caused undue burden or violated First Amendment protections, justifying sanctions. | Sanctions unavailable absent undue burden, facial defect, or bad faith. |
| Is undue burden limited to burdens of complying with the subpoena rather than the cost of advocacy? | Mount Hope argues burden includes costs of pursuing the subpoena, including guarding protected information. | Riseup/dkwatt assert the burden is tied to compliance costs to the subpoena recipient. | Undue burden is limited to compliance burdens of producing subpoenaed information. |
| Is bad faith required to sanction under Rule 45(c)(1) when the subpoena is otherwise proper? | Mount Hope contends bad faith is not necessary if duties under Rule 26(g) are violated. | Riseup/dkwatt maintain bad faith supports sanctions, especially where the subpoena is overbroad or aimed at evading protections. | Bad faith is sufficient but not necessary; sanctions may lie for other violations of Rule 45(c)(1) in good faith circumstances. |
| Should Rule 45(c)(1) sanctions be read to protect non-parties differently from parties to the underlying suit? | Mount Hope argues for a broader reading to protect non-parties from undue burdens. | Riseup/dkwatt resist expanding the standard beyond the burden of compliance. | Undue burden standard does not distinguish based solely on party status; non-parties are protected, but not by redefining undue burden. |
| How should Rule 45(c)(1) relate to Rule 26(g) duties when discovery issues arise about protected information? | Mount Hope emphasizes consistency with Rule 26(g) duties and good faith in discovery practice. | Riseup/dkwatt focus on protecting First Amendment rights and proper scope of subpoenas. | A violation of Rule 26(g) duties is relevant to sanctions under Rule 45(c)(1); the analysis hinges on the subpoena's scope and compliance. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (sanctions permissible for misuse of subpoenas; forms include fees)
- United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (two-part abuse-of-discretion test (legal rule and application))
- Hill v. MacMillan/McGraw-Hill Sch. Co., 102 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 1996) (abuse of discretion standard for sanctions)
- Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (U.S. 2011) (speech cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting)
- Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2005) (review framework for appellate review in certain discovery contexts)
- Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (balancing burdens against the interest in disclosure)