Mount Aldie, LLC v. Land Trust of Va., Inc.
293 Va. 190
Va.2017Background
- In 2008 a conservation easement (the Easement) on a 60‑acre Aldie, VA tract was granted to Land Trust of Virginia, Inc. (LTV); a 100‑foot riparian buffer along the Little River is designated in Article II, Section 3.
- Mount Aldie, LLC (MA) acquired the property in 2009 and in 2013 performed tree removal and grading within the buffer along the Indian Spring Trail for ~1,100 feet.
- LTV sued seeking injunctive relief or restoration damages, alleging MA breached the Easement by removing the historic footpath and disturbing >1,000 sq ft in the buffer without LTV notice/permission.
- LTV moved for partial summary judgment on liability, relying principally on Article II, Section 5(i) (limits on new openings/clearings >1,000 sq ft without Grantee approval); MA argued Section 3(ii) (permitted buffer activities) governs and contains no prior‑notice/approval requirement for certain activities (removal of dead/diseased trees; creation/maintenance of unimproved foot/horse trails).
- The trial court granted LTV partial summary judgment, construing “clearing” in §5(i) to include any earth‑disturbing activity and awarding damages and costs; MA appealed.
- The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding material factual disputes exist about (a) the nature/extent of MA’s work, (b) whether activities were reasonably necessary under §3(ii), and (c) whether §5(i) applies; remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MA breached §5(i) by disturbing >1,000 sq ft without prior notice/approval | LTV: MA admitted disturbing >1,000 sq ft in the buffer, so §5(i) was violated | MA: §5(i)’s “new opening or clearing” means clearing standing timber/brush (creating new openings), not routine earth disturbance or removing dead/diseased trees on an existing trail | Held: §5(i) applies to creating new openings/clearings of standing timber/brush; MA’s admission re: earth disturbance alone is not dispositive of a §5(i) breach |
| Whether activities within the buffer are governed by §3(ii) or constrained by §5(i) | LTV: §5(i) controls and §3(ii) is subject to §5(i) | MA: §3(ii) is a stand‑alone buffer regime allowing certain earth‑disturbing activities without prior Grantee approval if reasonably necessary | Held: §3(ii) is a distinct buffer provision focused on water quality and permits certain activities without explicit prior‑approval requirements; §5(i) does not automatically limit §3(ii) activities |
| Whether MA’s work (tree removal/clearing) was authorized by §3(ii) (reasonably necessary removal; trail maintenance) | LTV: MA exceeded permitted activities and altered trail into something else | MA: work removed dead/diseased trees and restored/maintained an unimproved trail suitable for foot/horse use | Held: Fact issues exist about pre‑work condition, whether trees removed were dead/diseased, and whether disturbance was reasonably necessary — summary judgment inappropriate |
| Whether LTV acquired exclusive control of the Indian Spring Trail under Article V, §2 | LTV: Article V, §2 gives Grantee right to construct and maintain a primitive footpath — implying control over the existing trail | MA: §2 conveys the right to construct/permit a primitive footpath but expressly reserves non‑exclusive access to the Grantor/landowner | Held: §2 grants Grantee a right to construct/maintain a primitive footpath but is non‑exclusive; it does not bar all landowner work in the buffer |
Key Cases Cited
- Kohn v. Marquis, 288 Va. 142 (summary judgment standards and de novo review of legal issues)
- Campbell Cnty. v. Royal, 283 Va. 4 (standard for summary judgment)
- Fultz v. Delhaize Am., Inc., 278 Va. 84 (summary judgment principles)
- Wetlands America Trust, Inc. v. White Cloud Nine Ventures, 291 Va. 153 (contract/easement construction — give effect to parties’ language)
- Camp v. Camp, 220 Va. 595 (deed construction principles)
- Squire v. Virginia Housing Dev. Auth., 287 Va. 507 (give words their ordinary meaning in context)
- Walton v. Capital Land, 252 Va. 324 (non‑exclusive easement rights and servient owner’s retained uses)
- McCarthy Holdings LLC v. Burgher, 282 Va. 267 (same principle on non‑exclusive easement use)