MOTOROLA INC. v. MICHAEL PATRICK MURRAY
147 A.3d 751
| D.C. | 2016Background
- Thirteen plaintiffs sued cellphone manufacturers and providers alleging long-term cell-phone radiation causes brain tumors; extensive expert hearings were held in Superior Court.
- Judge Weisberg applied the Dyas/Frye standard and found some plaintiff experts admissible under Frye but likely excludable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702/Daubert; he certified an interlocutory question on which standard to adopt.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals considered whether to retain Dyas/Frye, adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (as interpreted in Daubert and its progeny), or craft a revised Frye standard.
- The court analyzed the differences: Frye/Dyas focuses on general acceptance of methodology; Daubert/Rule 702 requires judicial gatekeeping of both methodology reliability and its application to the facts.
- After weighing criticisms of both regimes and emphasizing judges’ gatekeeping role, the court adopted Rule 702 for all trials beginning after the opinion’s date and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which admissibility standard should govern expert testimony in D.C. Superior Court? | Stick with Dyas/Frye because it is established and protects jury/fairness; applying a new rule now would be disruptive. | Adopt Fed. R. Evid. 702/Daubert to assess both methodology and application, aligning D.C. with federal and most states. | Adopt Rule 702 (Daubert framework) for trials starting after this opinion. |
| Should general acceptance alone determine admissibility? | General acceptance ensures baseline reliability and prevents judges from overreaching. | General acceptance is insufficient; courts must assess scientific validity and application. | Rejected Frye’s exclusive reliance on general acceptance; Rule 702 requires broader reliability inquiry. |
| Must courts assess whether experts reliably applied methods to the case facts? | Plaintiffs argued Frye does not require that application-level scrutiny and changing that disrupts reliance interests. | Defendants argued Rule 702(d) properly requires assessing reliable application to facts. | Court requires evaluation of both reliable principles/methods and reliable application (Rule 702(c)–(d)). |
| Do prior admissibility findings under Dyas/Frye automatically carry over? | Plaintiffs urged nonretroactive application or grandfathering for these cases. | Defendants supported applying the new rule going forward; no grandfathering. | No grandfathering; Rule 702 applies to trials beginning after the opinion; lower court may permit additional discovery. |
Key Cases Cited
- Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (articulated the "general acceptance" test for scientific evidence)
- Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977) (expanded Frye into a three-part expert admissibility test)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (held Frye superseded by the Federal Rules and established Daubert gatekeeping under Rule 702)
- General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (permitted exclusion where analytical gap between data and opinion is too great)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extended Daubert gatekeeping to all expert testimony and emphasized flexible reliability inquiry)
- Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (noted special scrutiny for expert testimony and explained limits of Frye/Dyas)