183 A.3d 211
Md.2018Background
- At ~2:05 a.m. on April 19, 2016 Officer Ditoto stopped Megan Smith for driving without headlights, detected a strong odor of alcohol, and Smith performed poorly on field sobriety tests. She was transported to the state police barracks.
- At the station Officer Ditoto read and Smith signed the DR-15 Advice of Rights form describing the rights and sanctions for refusing or submitting to chemical testing. Smith asked to use the restroom before testing; the officer refused and told her restroom use would be allowed only after the intoximeter.
- Smith submitted to a breath test that produced a .18 BAC. At the administrative hearing she argued she was coerced into submitting because denial of restroom use, combined with alleged cognitive impairment (Trisomy X), undermined voluntary consent.
- The ALJ granted Smith’s Motion for No Action, finding coercion, and the circuit court affirmed for lack of substantial evidence to the contrary. The MVA appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed: it held Smith was properly advised, the refusal to permit restroom use did not render her decision involuntary as a matter of law, and the administrative process set forth in TRANSP. § 16-205.1 is sufficient to protect due process rights. The case was remanded for further administrative proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | MVA's Argument | Smith's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denying a request to use the restroom before testing coerced Smith into submitting to a breath test | Denial was a non-coercive, routine measure to preserve test integrity under COMAR and necessary to prevent contamination; it did not impair voluntariness | Denial created a "road block" that pressured Smith to take the test rather than delay, especially given her alleged cognitive impairment | Denial of restroom use did not render submission involuntary; ALJ’s coercion finding was erroneous and reversed |
| Whether Smith was properly advised of statutory rights before testing | Officer read DR-15 and Smith signed it; advisement satisfied TRANSP. §16-205.1 | Advisement was insufficient because Smith’s alleged cognitive impairment meant she could not understand the form | Court found advisement adequate; Smith offered no evidence that officer knew of any cognitive impairment or that she failed to understand the DR-15 |
| Sufficiency of the administrative procedure (due process) for implied-consent testing | TRANSP. §16-205.1 (with DR-15, written acknowledgement, and administrative hearing review) provides adequate procedural protections against erroneous deprivation | Procedural safeguards were inadequate when applied to individuals with impairments or when officers create coercive conditions | Court held the statutory/advisory process adequately balances private and governmental interests and limits risk of erroneous deprivation |
| Remedy for any due process violation (exclusion of test result) | Even if process flaws exist, exclusionary rule does not apply to administrative license suspension proceedings | Smith sought relief via dismissal/no-action based on coercion | Court reiterated exclusionary rule in this context is inapplicable; remedy is administrative review, not suppression of BAC evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 630 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993) (officer must not induce refusal or construct roadblocks that affect decision-making)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Dove, 991 A.2d 65 (Md. 2010) (refusal must be voluntary and with knowledge of rights on the Advice of Rights form)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 997 A.2d 768 (Md. 2010) (exclusionary rule inapplicable to administrative license suspension proceedings)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Krafft, 158 A.3d 539 (Md. 2017) (discussing implied consent under TRANSP. §16-205.1)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shepard, 923 A.2d 100 (Md. 2007) (purpose of implied-consent statute is public safety and encouragement of testing)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 844 A.2d 388 (Md. 2004) (§16-205.1 provides swift administrative penalties separate from criminal sanctions)
- In re Ryan W., 76 A.3d 1049 (Md. 2013) (due process balancing factors for risk of erroneous deprivation)
- Anderson v. Gen. Casualty Ins. Co., 935 A.2d 746 (Md. 2007) (standard of review for administrative decisions)