Motor Vehicle Administration v. Aiken
12 A.3d 656
| Md. | 2011Background
- MVA v. Aiken involves Maryland's implied-consent, administrative-per se statute TR § 16-205.1 and whether the MVA must prove a test was administered by a 'qualified person' using equipment approved by the toxicologist in the prima facie case.
- Respondent Brittany Aiken was stopped for speeding, showed strong odor of alcohol, failed field sobriety tests, and was arrested for DUI; she consented to a breath test which yielded 0.16 BAC.
- The MVA issued an order of suspension under TR § 16-205.1(b)(3) based on Form DR-15 and DR-15A, but did not while the hearing record include MSP Form 33 or the EC/IR test strip.
- At the show-cause ALJ hearing, the MVA relied on the sworn statements in DR-15A; Respondent argued the record lacked evidence that testing complied with CJP § 10-304 requirements.
- The Circuit Court reversed, holding the prima facie case required additional certificates/records; the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court, holding the DR-15A sworn statements suitably established the prima facie case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the prima facie case requires a 'qualified person' and approved equipment. | Aiken argues yes; must show 10-304 qualifications. | Aiken contends statute mandates 10-304 compliance to establish prima facie. | No; DR-15A sworn statements suffice to establish prima facie case. |
| Whether the MSP Form 33 and EC/IR test strip are required to be in the record to sustain suspension. | Aiken asserts absence defeats prima facie evidence. | Aiken should have requested subpoena; not required for prima facie. | Not required; absence does not defeat prima facie evidence. |
| Whether the show-cause hearing is limited to enumerated issues and impacts need for 10-304 certification. | Aiken relies on broader CJP requirements. | Statute limits issues at hearing to enumerated items; no 10-304 requirement for prima facie. | Yes; statute confines issues and allows prima facie evidence from DR-15A. |
Key Cases Cited
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, 415 Md. 1 (2010) (administrative-review deference and scope of review in MVA decisions)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Delawter, 403 Md. 243 (2008) (administrative per se procedures and remedy scope)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37 (2003) (statutory context and purpose of the implied-consent scheme)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Jones, 380 Md. 164 (2004) (two-hour testing window not required to be part of prima facie case)
- Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356 (1999) (remedial purpose of statute and swift administrative sanctions)