Moten v. United States, 81 A.3d 1274

Mot en was convicted after a bench trial of soliciting prostitution under D.C. Code § 22-2701 (2009 Supp.).
The 2009 Omnibus Act amended § 22-2701 to set penalties for prostitution, with ambiguity whether it covered solicitation.
Appellant argued the 2009 amendment lacked a penalty for solicitation, potentially making solicitation not a crime, and that the trial court erred in sentencing.
The court interpreted the 2009 text and legislative history to hold that penalties for solicitation remained identical to those for engaging in prostitution, despite drafting ambiguity.
On appeal, the court also considered sufficiency of evidence to prove solicitation, relying on undercover officer Davis’s testimony that appellant offered drugs and shelter in exchange for sex.
The court affirmed the conviction, concluding the evidence supported solicitation beyond a reasonable doubt and that the penalty for solicitation existed under the 2009 statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2009 amendment prescribed a penalty for solicitation	Moten argues the 2009 law omitted a penalty for solicitation.	Moten argues the penalty gap renders solicitation not a crime.	Penalties for solicitation remained identical to those for engaging in prostitution under 2009 statute.
Interpretation of the penalty language in 2009 statute	Ambiguity requires treating solicitation as uncriminalized absent penalty.	Legislative history shows the Council intended same penalties for solicitation and engaging in prostitution.	Ambiguity resolved in favor of including solicitation within penalties; statutory language and history support this reading.
Sufficiency of evidence to prove solicitation	Evidence insufficient as it relied on one officer’s testimony with no explicit monetary exchange.	Officer Davis’s testimony that appellant offered weed and shelter for sex suffices to prove solicitation.	Evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant solicited for prostitution.
Appropriate standard of review and potential lenity/plain error issues	Argument could be reviewed de novo or for plain error due to ambiguity in penalties.	Courts should apply the statute as intended; lenity not implicated given legislative history.	Same outcome under either de novo or plain error review; the 2009 statute prescribed a penalty.

United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 ( Supreme Court 1948) (legislative fixing of penalties is a function of Congress)
Ford I, 498 A.2d 1135 (D.C. 1985) (solicitation conviction does not require a specific phrase)
Ford II, 533 A.2d 617 (D.C. 1987) (en banc; articulation of solicitation under prior standards)
Rose v. United States, 535 A.2d 849 (D.C. 1987) (insufficient evidence where only distant observations; not controlling here)
Thompson v. United States, 618 A.2d 110 (D.C.1992) (mere initiation of conversations does not shield the invitee from statute)
Muse v. United States, 522 A.2d 888 (D.C.1987) (fee not limited to money; exchange can be other goods)
Haney v. United States, 473 A.2d 393 (D.C.1984) (interpretation of statutory language and legislative intent)
Jeffrey v. United States, 892 A.2d 1122 (D.C.2006) (statutory interpretation and purpose considerations)
Mitchell v. District of Columbia, 741 A.2d 1049 (D.C.1999) (plain error and miscarriage of justice considerations)
Washington Gas Light v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of the District of Columbia, 982 A.2d 691 (D.C.2009) (subsequent legislative history can illuminate earlier statute interpretation)