Moss v. State
2013 Ark. 512
Ark.2013Background
- In 1981 John T. Moss and two others were tried for capital felony murder and attempted capital felony murder; Moss admitted presence but claimed nonparticipation. The jury returned a single sentence: life without parole for capital felony murder. This Court affirmed the conviction.
- In 2010 Moss sought permission in this Court to file a Rule 37.1 postconviction petition in the trial court, arguing the judgment could be read to reflect convictions for both offenses and thus was void; this Court denied the petition.
- In 2012 Moss filed a pro se "Motion to Adjust Sentence" in the trial court, renewing the claim that the jury and judgment erroneously reflected both capital and attempted capital convictions and asserting ADC records incorrectly show separate sentences.
- The trial court dismissed the 2012 motion; Moss appealed and sought leave to file a belated brief.
- The Supreme Court held the 2012 filing was a Rule 37.1 postconviction petition and dismissed the appeal as procedurally barred because Moss had not obtained this Court's leave to proceed below and had not been granted leave to file a second petition after the 2010 denial. The Court also found the ADC-records complaint is not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2012 "Motion to Adjust Sentence" is a proper independent motion or a Rule 37.1 petition | Moss argued the trial court erred by not instructing separate sentencing and that the judgment/ADC records show convictions and life sentences for both offenses | State argued the filing constituted a postconviction challenge governed by Rule 37.1 and was procedurally improper | Court held the motion was a Rule 37.1 petition and thus subject to Rule 37.1’s leave and successive-petition limits; appeal dismissed |
| Whether Moss could proceed in the trial court without leave from this Court under the version of Rule 37.1 applicable to his conviction | Moss proceeded below without first obtaining this Court’s permission | State relied on the pre-1989 Rule 37.1 requirement that petitioners who appealed must obtain this Court’s leave to proceed in the trial court | Court held Moss was required to obtain this Court’s leave and his failure to do so compelled dismissal |
| Whether a second Rule 37.1 petition is permitted after a prior denial | Moss sought to relitigate the claim in a later petition | State noted Rule 37.2(b) bars second petitions unless first was denied without prejudice allowing a later filing | Court held Moss could not file a successive petition because his 2010 denial did not grant leave to file again |
| Whether a claim that ADC records misstate the judgment is cognizable in a Rule 37.1 petition | Moss argued ADC custody records incorrectly reflect two convictions and sentences | State argued Rule 37.1 challenges the judgment itself, not administrative records of incarceration | Court held errors in ADC records are not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 postconviction petition |
Key Cases Cited
- Moss v. State, 280 Ark. 27, 655 S.W.2d 375 (Ark. 1983) (affirming conviction and sentence)
- Ruiz v. State, 280 Ark. 190, 655 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1983) (successive-petition rule principles)
- Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (Ark. 1984) (Rule 37.1 pleading treated as postconviction petition regardless of label)
- Williams v. State, 273 Ark. 315, 619 S.W.2d 628 (Ark. 1981) (successive-petition precedent)