Moss v. City of Dunwoody, 293 Ga. 858

Dunwoody adopted an occupational tax ordinance in Dec. 2008 (amended 2010) requiring businesses, including attorneys with offices in the city, to register, obtain an occupational tax certificate, and pay an annual tax (either gross-receipts-based or a flat $400).
Appellants Moss and Rothenberg are attorneys who maintain offices in Dunwoody and sued for declaratory and injunctive relief in April 2010, challenging the ordinance as unconstitutional.
Trial court (May 16, 2012) held the ordinance constitutional as applied; after an amended counterclaim and determination that the amendment was operatively indistinguishable, the court ordered appellants to register and pay taxes, penalties, and interest for 2009–2011, denying the City attorney fees.
Appellants argued (1) the ordinance operates as an unconstitutional precondition/license or otherwise improperly regulates the practice of law, and (2) it violates equal protection by applying only to attorneys practicing within the city and by using the highest gross-receipts rate.
The City defended the ordinance as a revenue measure that treats attorneys like other businesses, imposes only civil enforcement (no criminal sanctions or power to suspend practice), and reasonably taxes those using city services.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, finding the ordinance a valid revenue tax (not a regulatory precondition), and that it satisfies rational-basis equal protection review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Dunwoody's occupational tax acts as an unconstitutional precondition or regulatory fee on the practice of law	Moss: registration, certificate, inspection, and reporting to the State Bar make the ordinance a precondition/license that impermissibly regulates attorneys	City: the ordinance is a revenue measure; taxes are paid in arrears, enforcement is civil (execution, penalties), no power to suspend practice; reporting to State Bar does not itself regulate	The ordinance is a valid revenue tax, not a regulatory fee; its operative effects do not create a precondition or otherwise unlawfully regulate law practice
Whether the ordinance violates equal protection/arbitrary classification	Moss: singling out attorneys practicing within city limits and taxing them at the highest rate is arbitrary and unequal	City: taxation is limited to those who maintain offices in Dunwoody and benefit from city services; all attorneys subject to the ordinance are taxed uniformly under its scheme	Rational-basis review applies; classification reasonably relates to legitimate purpose (funding city services); no equal protection violation

Sexton v. City of Jonesboro, 267 Ga. 571 (discussion of when occupational taxes become impermissible regulatory fees)
City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449 (factors indicating regulatory character of an ordinance)
Gleason v. City Council of Augusta, 242 Ga. 796 (upholding municipal revenue tax enforced civilly against attorneys)
Boswell v. City of Valdosta, 229 Ga. 752 (treatment of municipal occupation taxes on attorneys)
Brown v. City of Atlanta, 221 Ga. 121 (historical treatment of occupation taxes vis-à-vis regulation of professions)
Chanin v. Bibb County, 234 Ga. 282 (municipal taxing authority and limits concerning professions)
Richmond County Business Assn. v. Richmond County, 224 Ga. 854 (distinguishing taxes from licenses by substance)
Coolidge v. Mayor & Alderman of Savannah, 128 Ga. App. 704 (requirement of uniform taxation within taxing authority)