Moses v. Skandera, 367 P.3d 838

New Mexico's Instructional Material Law (IML) creates a state-funded program that purchases approved instructional materials and lends them to eligible students in public and private schools; funds come from a non-reverting instructional material fund (including federal MLLA-derived money) and legislative appropriations.
Private schools receive an allocation based on enrollment and may spend up to 50% on non-list items so long as materials are nonreligious; unused balances may carry over.
Petitioners (taxpayers with children in public schools) sued, seeking declaratory relief that the IML violates several New Mexico constitutional provisions, chiefly Article XII, § 3 (prohibiting use of educational funds to support sectarian, denominational, or private schools).
The district court and Court of Appeals upheld the IML; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address multiple issues but resolved the case on Article XII, § 3 grounds.
The Supreme Court held the IML unconstitutional under Article XII, § 3 because lending state-purchased textbooks to private schools (even indirectly) supplies support to private schools—contrary to the Blaine-like restriction incorporated into New Mexico’s constitution via the Enabling Act and the Constitutional Convention’s broader language.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the IML violates N.M. Const. art. XII, § 3 (prohibiting educational funds for sectarian, denominational, or private schools)	Moses: Lending state-purchased instructional materials to students in private schools constitutes impermissible support to private/sectarian schools	Skandera/Intervenors: The program benefits individual students (not schools) and is analogous to public-library lending or a permissible child-benefit; funds may be used for "public service" (MLLA)	Court: Article XII, § 3 bars both direct and indirect support to private schools; the IML violates § 3 because private schools gain material benefit and can reallocate their own resources as a result
Whether federal MLLA funds or legislative discretion preempt the state constitutional restriction	Moses: State constitution controls use of funds for educational purposes regardless of source	Intervenors: MLLA-derived funds permit legislative discretion to use funds for public services, so federal funds used here are not subject to state constitutional limits	Court: MLLA does not preempt Article XII, § 3; Congress’s grant does not permit the Legislature to override state constitutional limits on funds appropriated for educational purposes

Zellers v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949 (N.M. 1951) (prior state case relied on by petitioners)
California Teachers Ass’n v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981) (textbook-lending program invalid under state Blaine-like provision; rejects child-benefit circumventing clause)
Gaffney v. State Dep’t of Educ., 220 N.W.2d 550 (Neb. 1974) (textbook loan program held to furnish unconstitutional aid to private sectarian schools)
Spears v. Honda, 449 P.2d 130 (Haw. 1968) (state bus subsidy to private school students violates state constitutional prohibition on using public funds to benefit nonpublic schools)
Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256 (1985) (federal funding allocation to local governments preemption context discussed and distinguished)
State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974) (limits on legislative control over use of certain federal funds to institutions of higher learning; distinguished on facts)