409 P.3d 1236
Wyo.2018Background
- Jonathon Moser, a middle/high school special education teacher, was convicted after a jury trial of three counts of second-degree sexual assault of a minor and one count of first-degree sexual assault of a minor based on incidents at Rawlins Middle School and Glenrock High School.
- Multiple students reported inappropriate touching (thighs, buttocks, breasts, hand-holding, rubbing over clothing) during detentions, volleyball activities, and classroom interactions; one victim (AC) later reported an alleged forcible intercourse during detention.
- The State gave notice it would offer other-acts evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) consisting of testimony from several students describing similar touching; the trial court held a pretrial 404(b) hearing and admitted a narrowed set of that testimony while excluding vague or cumulative material.
- Defense counsel sought to cross-examine AC about her prior experience as a victim in an earlier sexual-assault matter to impeach her claim she delayed reporting because she was afraid; the court held a rape-shield hearing and excluded that specific cross-examination.
- Moser appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion in admitting 404(b) evidence and in restricting cross-examination under the rape-shield statute; the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Moser) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of other-acts evidence under W.R.E. 404(b) | Evidence was offered for proper purposes (motive, plan/modus operandi, course of conduct) and was relevant to show pattern and sexual motive | Evidence was nonsexual, too remote/fragmented to show a course of conduct, and unfairly prejudicial propensity evidence | Court affirmed admission of a narrowed set of specific touching incidents as relevant to motive, intent, and course of conduct and not unfairly prejudicial |
| Restriction on cross-examining AC about being a prior sexual-assault complainant | The rape-shield statute limits admission; even if noticed late, the court should exclude evidence whose probative value does not substantially outweigh prejudice | Cross-examination was probative to impeach AC’s claim she delayed reporting due to fear (showing she had prior contact with law enforcement and was treated fairly) | Court affirmed exclusion under the rape-shield statute; defense was allowed broad questioning about AC’s contacts with police, but her status as a prior sexual-assault complainant was excluded as unduly prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- Griggs v. State, 367 P.3d 1108 (Wyo. 2016) (other-acts analysis and risks of unfair prejudice)
- Gleason v. State, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002) (required multi-factor 404(b) framework)
- Garrison v. State, 409 P.3d 1209 (Wyo. 2018) (course-of-conduct caution and standard of review)
- McGarvey v. State, 325 P.3d 450 (Wyo. 2014) (rape-shield evidentiary standard: generally inadmissible absent unusual probative value)
- Huckfeldt v. State, 297 P.3d 97 (Wyo. 2013) (other sexual misconduct probative of sexual motive)
- Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987) (contextual relevance of related acts)
- Carroll v. State, 352 P.3d 251 (Wyo. 2015) (policy rationale for rape-shield and related admissibility principles)
- United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoted multi-step 404(b) test procedure)
