Moryl v. Ransone
2014 Ind. LEXIS 168
| Ind. | 2014Background
- Indiana Medical Malpractice Act filing timing is at issue; the Court of Appeals held filing occurs on receipt, Supreme Court grants transfer.
- Plaintiff’s husband died while under defendants’ care in 2007; plaintiff mailed proposed complaint via FedEx Priority Overnight on April 19, 2009.
- Department received and filed the proposed complaint on April 21, 2009, which was after the two-year statute of limitations began.
- Lower courts granted summary judgment for defendants, relying on 34-18-7-3(b) rather than general Trial Rule 5 timing.
- Indiana Code 1-1-7-1 allows designated private delivery services to substitute for registered/certified mail for notice; issue is how it applies to filing a proposed medical malpractice complaint.
- Court holds that filing occurs upon mailing with a designated private delivery service if the service meets statutory requirements, making the claim timely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether filing occurs upon mailing via private delivery service. | Moryl contends filing is the mailing/deposit date, regardless of method. | Defendants argue filing is controlled by 34-18-7-3(b) and requires receipt. | Filing occurs upon mailing/deposit with a designated private delivery service. |
| Whether 1-1-7-1 supersedes 34-18-7-3(b) for private delivery services. | 1-1-7-1 governs notice via private delivery services, should control. | 34-18-7-3(b) remains controlling for filings; no ambiguity. | 1-1-7-1 supersedes and harmonizes with 34-18-7-3(b); FedEx qualifies. |
| Whether FedEx Priority Overnight qualifies as a designated private delivery service under 1-1-7-1. | FedEx is a designated private delivery service and tracks delivery; meets signature requirement. | Not specifically named in 34-18-7-3(b); reliance on other statutes. | FedEx Priority Overnight satisfies 1-1-7-1 and is treated as filing. |
| Whether the plaintiff’s evidence created a genuine issue of material fact on timely filing. | Paralegal affidavit and FedEx records show mailing on April 19, 2009. | Evidence does not overcome the mailing-date theory under the statute. | No genuine issue; timely filing established as a matter of law. |
| Whether the decision aligns with statutory interpretation principles and legislative intent. | Legislature intended timely notice via modern delivery services. | Prefer strict construction of 34-18-7-3(b) and avoid new assumptions. | Harmonization of statutes; designated private delivery services are treated as registered/certified mail. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bielat v. Folta, 141 Ind.App. 452, 229 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967) (judicial notice of new arguments on appeal)
- State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Lake Superior Court, 820 N.E.2d 1240 (Ind. 2005) (departure from form over substance in statutory interpretation)
- In re Estate of Robertson, 859 N.E.2d 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (dissent cited on substantive questions)
- Universal Outdoor, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind. 2008) (approach to harmonizing conflicting statutes)
- Klotz v. Hoyt, 900 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2009) (statutory interpretation in appellate review; de novo standard)
- Money Store Inv. Corp. v. Summers, 849 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. 2006) (application of trial rules and notice)
- Hochstedler v. St. Joseph Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (considerations on presenting new issues on appeal)