Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Robinson
671 F. App'x 562
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Daniel and Darla Robinson obtained a state-court quiet title judgment that expunged a deed of trust recorded against their property.
- The recorded deed of trust named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee/beneficiary with authority to initiate foreclosure.
- MERS sued in federal court to set aside the quiet title judgment and to obtain relief for not being named as a defendant in the state action.
- The district court granted MERS’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Robinsons’ motions to modify the scheduling order, to compel discovery, and for a continuance.
- The Robinsons appealed; the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the quiet title judgment violated MERS’s rights and that the district court’s pretrial and summary-judgment rulings were not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Robinsons’ Argument | MERS’ Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction / Rooker–Feldman | Federal court lacked jurisdiction because relief required review of state-court judgment | Federal court had jurisdiction under § 1332; Rooker–Feldman inapplicable because MERS was not a party to the state action | Court had jurisdiction; Rooker–Feldman did not apply |
| Validity/effect of quiet title judgment given deed naming MERS | Quiet title judgment should stand; deed of trust void as to MERS under state registration statute | Deed of trust gave MERS recorded adverse claim and authority to foreclose; Robinsons were required to name MERS in quiet title action | Quiet title judgment violated MERS’s rights; Robinsons had to name MERS as defendant |
| Applicability of California Revenue & Taxation Code § 23304.1 (capacity to contract) | Deed void as to MERS because MERS not registered to do business in CA when deed executed | Section inapplicable because MERS was named beneficiary/nominee, not a signatory/contracting party | § 23304.1 inapplicable; MERS need not have been a signatory to be an adverse claimant |
| Denial of Robinsons’ discovery/scheduling/continuance requests | Robinsons needed more time/discovery to oppose summary judgment | Robinsons failed to act diligently and showed no good cause or prejudice | Denials were within district court’s discretion; summary judgment proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (per curiam) (Rooker–Feldman doctrine scope)
- Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (standing and redressability)
- Zivkovic v. Southern California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002) (Rule 16(b) diligence/good-cause standard)
- Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2002) (discovery prejudice standard)
- Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (Rule 56(d) continuance standard)
- Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2004) (standing analysis principles)
- Calvo v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 199 Cal. App. 4th 118 (Cal. Ct. App.) (MERS as nominee/authority to foreclose)
- Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1149 (Cal. Ct. App.) (same)