Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County
294 Ga. 212
| Ga. | 2013Background
- MAC sought inverse condemnation against Pickens County for an alleged taking based on the August 2006 Letter, claiming it forced development off Silverstone without just compensation.
- The August 2006 Letter stated the County’s position that any subdivision proposal must comply with the current county code.
- MAC had not obtained a final County decision on Silverstone; earlier denials and a moratorium had occurred before the letter.
- MAC subsequently pursued Hampton Farms, a separate subdivision plan, and the County approved rezoning for that project in October 2006.
- The trial court granted summary judgment, holding the August 2006 Letter was a final decision and that MAC’s claim was time-barred under OCGA § 5-3-20; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The Georgia Supreme Court held the August 2006 Letter was not a final decision, so the inverse condemnation claim never ripened, affirming the Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the August 2006 Letter a 'decision' subject to OCGA § 5-3-20? | MAC argued the letter reflected a final County decision applying the amended code. | The County contends the letter was only a non-final position, not a decision. | No; the letter was not a decision. |
| If not a decision, did MAC’s claim ripen for judicial review or timing under § 5-3-20 apply? | MAC asserted timing controls applied to a final decision that triggered an appeal window. | Without a final decision, § 5-3-20 did not commence and the claim was not ripe. | The claim did not ripen; § 5-3-20 did not bar review. |
| Do Open Meetings Act requirements affect whether the letter constitutes a final decision? | If a final decision occurred in a public meeting, it would be reflected in minutes and thus a proper decision. | There is no final decision in an open meeting yet, as the letter was not discussed or minuted as such. | Open Meetings Act supports that there was no final decision by the County on Silverstone. |
| Should exhaustion of administrative remedies apply to render the claim ripe? | MAC could have pursued a final administrative decision under County Code procedures. | Exhaustion is required before judicial review of regulatory takings. | MAC failed to exhaust administrative remedies; claim unripe. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chadwick v. Gwinnett County, 257 Ga. 59, 59 (354 SE2d 420) (1987) (Ga. 1987) (final decision under OCGA § 5-3-20 in zoning context)
- Taco Mac v. Atlanta Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Ga. 538, 539 (340 SE2d 922) (1986) (Ga. 1986) (denial of variance; timing of entry)
- May or Alderman of City of Savannah v. Savannah Cigarette & Amusement Svcs., Inc., 267 Ga. 173, 174 (476 SE2d 581) (1996) (Ga. 1996) (open meetings and appeals timing)
- Savannah Cigarette & Amusement Svcs., Inc. v. City of Savannah, 267 Ga. 173, 174 (476 SE2d 581) (1996) (Ga. 1996) (timing of entry for zoning decisions)
- Settles Bridge Farm, LLC v. City of Suwanee, 292 Ga. 434, 437 (738 SE2d 597) (2013) (Ga. 2013) (ripe vs. unripe; exhaustion of administrative remedies)
- WMW, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 291 Ga. 683, 683 (733 SE2d 269) (2012) (Ga. 2012) (affirming judgment on certiorari under right-for-any-reason doctrine)
- Dept. of Transp. v. Poole, 179 Ga. App. 638, 640 (347 SE2d 625) (1986) (Ga. App. 1986) (entry date and administrative appeal procedure)
- Hollberg v. Spalding County, 281 Ga. App. 768, 771 & n.13 (637 SE2d 163) (2006) (Ga. App. 2006) (zoning decision and open meetings context)
- City of Suwanee v. Settles Bridge Farm, LLC, 292 Ga. 434, 437 (738 SE2d 597) (2013) (Ga. 2013) (ripeness and exhaustion doctrine in takings context)