Morse v. Cloutier
869 F.3d 16
1st Cir.2017Background
- On Aug. 16, 2009, police responded to reports that Charles Morse had been throwing rocks/bottles, using racial epithets, and threatened to murder two young men; victims warned Morse might be armed.
- Officers located Morse's house ~1 hour later; after knocking he opened an interior back door and locked the screen door; he declined to step outside and told officers to return with a warrant.
- Officers warned they would force entry, then kicked through the screen and wooden interior doors, entered with guns drawn, and arrested Morse; his wife was briefly handcuffed during a protective sweep.
- Morse was charged; charges were later dropped. The Morses sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Amendment), the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The district court denied summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment / qualified immunity grounds (finding disputed facts on exigent circumstances and holding Payton-controlled law clearly established). It denied summary judgment on state-law claims. Defendants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warrantless entry into home — exigent circumstances | No exigency existed given ~1 hour lapse, victims protected, and no evidence of escape, destruction of evidence, or danger | Entry was justified by exigent circumstances (hot pursuit/threat of violence) | Whether exigency existed turns on disputed facts; appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review factual disputes and must view facts for plaintiffs — genuine issues preclude summary review |
| Doorway-arrest exception (Santana) | Santana inapplicable: Morse remained behind locked door, was summoned to door by police, and was not effectively in public | Santana controls: by coming to the door Morse exposed himself and could be arrested without warrant | Santana does not control; facts (locked door, summoned by police, no hot pursuit) distinguish Santana; Payton's bright-line protection of the home applies |
| Qualified immunity | Officers violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights protecting the home absent warrant or exigency | Officers entitled to qualified immunity because law on doorway arrests was unsettled (Joyce) | On plaintiffs’ version of facts, officers violated a clearly established rule (Payton and progeny); qualified immunity denied at summary judgment stage |
| State-law claims (MCRA, IIED) | Plaintiffs’ claims survive summary judgment on factual record | Defendants sought summary judgment on merits | Denial of summary judgment on state-law claims is a non-appealable interlocutory order; those aspects of the appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (warrantless entry into home presumptively unreasonable; "firm line" at entrance to house)
- United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (doorway arrest where suspect voluntarily in doorway and officers in hot pursuit)
- Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (doorway-arrest qualified-immunity analysis; law unsettled in 1989)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (third-party home arrest requires search warrant to enter)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (exigent-circumstances inquiry; caution re: police-created exigency)