Morrow v. Morrow
129 So. 3d 142
| Miss. | 2013Background
- The Morrows owned ~200 acres; in 1993 they conveyed the property to son Phillip in fee simple (Deed 1).
- In 1996, parties executed two deeds: Morrows to Phillip reserving a life estate (Deed 2, acknowledged March 23, recorded April 23) and Phillip back to the Morrows (Deed 3, acknowledged April 22, recorded April 22).
- Recording chronology showed Deed 3 recorded April 22 and Deed 2 recorded April 23, but acknowledgments on the face of the deeds suggested Deed 2 was executed earlier (March 23).
- The Morrows died intestate (1999, 2000). Chancellor held the acknowledgment dates controlled, so title vested in the Morrows at death and passed equally to all three sons; chancery denied equitable lien to Phillip.
- Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding recording raised a presumption of delivery on the recording dates and no rebuttal evidence was presented; title vested in Phillip at Reba Morrow’s death and the chancery must quiet title in Phillip.
Issues
| Issue | Morrow's Argument | Ronald/Joel's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did Deeds 2 and 3 become effective (delivery date)? | Deeds effective on recording dates (presumption of delivery); Deed 3 effective 4/22, Deed 2 effective 4/23, so Phillip held remainder that vested at parents’ death. | Acknowledgment dates control; Section 89-5-13 validates the acknowledgments and the deeds relate back to those signed dates. | Recording raises presumption of delivery on recording dates; acknowledgments did not rebut presumption. Deed 3 effective 4/22 and Deed 2 effective 4/23; title vested in Phillip at death. |
| Applicability of Miss. Code § 89-5-13 (curative statute) | § 89-5-13 does not determine when a deed becomes effective; it is a curative statute for defective acknowledgments but does not conclusively fix delivery date. | § 89-5-13 validates acknowledgments after long recording and therefore supports using the acknowledgment dates as execution/delivery dates. | § 89-5-13 is a curative presumption about acknowledgments but does not substitute for proof of delivery; the chancery erred relying on it to fix delivery dates absent consideration of delivery/acceptance. |
| Alternative remedies: reformation / doctrine of after-acquired property (DAAP) / equitable lien | Phillip argued for reformation of Deed 2, DAAP, or an equitable lien if quiet title fails. | Opposed equitable remedies; maintained deeds as controlling per acknowledgments. | Court found title vested in Phillip and remanded to quiet title; because title was quieted in Phillip, equitable lien issue dismissed as moot. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Estate of Hardy, 910 So.2d 1052 (Miss. 2005) (delivery and recording principles; deed not effective without delivery)
- Grubbs v. Everett, 111 So.2d 923 (Miss. 1959) (signed and acknowledged deed not effective without delivery)
- Martin v. Adams, 62 So.2d 328 (Miss. 1953) (deed acceptance/delivery principle)
- Thompson v. Shell W. & P. Inc., 607 So.2d 37 (Miss. 1992) (recording raises presumption of delivery)
- Greenlee v. Mitchell, 607 So.2d 97 (Miss. 1992) (interpretation of curative acknowledgment statute)
- Carlisle v. Allen, 40 So.3d 1252 (Miss. 2010) (application of chancery review standards)