Morrison Enterprises, LLC v. Dravo Corp.
638 F.3d 594
8th Cir.2011Background
- Site involves Hastings groundwater contamination with discharges from FAR-MAR-CO, Colorado Avenue, and North Landfill subsites, contaminating municipal wells.
- Morrison, City of Hastings, and Dravo are CERCLA liable parties; Morrison and City filed §107(a) cost-recovery claims against Dravo.
- EPA actions and multiple AOCs/consent decrees required Morrison to operate Well-D and fund remediation at several subsites.
- District court held §113(f) provides exclusive remedy for costs incurred under settlements/ENFORCEMENT actions, and the City’s water-system relocation claims were time-barred.
- Morrison, City, and Dravo sought to allocate shared liability and pursue contributions for Well-D costs.
- Judgment entered against Morrison on §107 claims; district court preserved §113(f) exclusivity and denied leave to amend for Morrison.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §113(f) exclusive remedy applies to compelled costs | Morrison argues §107(a) allows direct cost recovery | Dravo argues §113(f) is exclusive when settlement/ENforcement actions exist | §113(f) exclusive remedy applies |
| Whether Morrison's Well-D costs were voluntary | Morrison says costs were voluntary cleanup | Costs incurred under AOC and consent decree were compelled | Costs were not voluntary; §107(a) not available |
| Whether City's water-supply relocation is a removal or remedial action | City contends removal action applies | Court should view as remedial action to provide permanent water supply | Relocation constitutes a remedial action; §113(g)(2)(B) bars claims |
| Whether the City's prior §107 claims against Dravo count as an initial action under §113(g)(2) | Prior claims could serve as initial action | Subsequent action rule requires §107 action tied to same plaintiff; prior claims don't count | Prior §113(f) claims do not constitute an initial action; §113(g)(2) not triggered |
| Whether Morrison's motion to amend was properly denied for good cause | Amendment should be allowed to pursue §113 claim | Late amendment would prejudice and disrupt judgment | District court did not abuse discretion; no good cause shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States, 551 U.S. 128 (U.S. 2007) (defines §107 and §113(f) distinct remedies; §113(f) exclusive when settlement actions exist)
- United States v. Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001) (allocation and divisibility of liability; joint and several liability)
- Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995) (allocation of response costs among liable parties; reliance on common liability factors)
- NIagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (limits on allowing §107 claims when §113(f) applies; efficiency of remedies)
- ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2007) (construes relationship between §107 and §113(f) remedies)
- United States v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 152 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 1998) (subsequent-action limitations and timing under §113(g)(2))
- Minnesota v. Kalman W. Abrams Metals, Inc., 155 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 1998) (removal vs remedial actions definitions in CERCLA context)