Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1082

Background

Plaintiffs (western Idaho residents) challenge 36 C.F.R. § 327.13, a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regulation that broadly prohibits possession of loaded firearms and related items on Corps-administered lands, with limited exceptions for law enforcement, hunting/fishing, authorized ranges, or written permission.
The regulation applies to Corps-managed dam and reservoir projects and surrounding recreation areas used by millions of visitors annually.
Plaintiffs allege the rule (1) bans firearms in tents and (2) bans carrying firearms on Corps recreation sites, thereby violating the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.
The Corps moved to dismiss, arguing Corps lands are proprietorily managed and may be regulated more tightly (invoking a rational-basis standard); plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement for law-abiding persons carrying functional firearms for self-defense.
The Court denied the motion to dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of § 327.13 as to law-abiding individuals possessing functional firearms on Corps lands for self-defense; the injunction is preliminary and the Corps may develop a factual record at trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 327.13 burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment	The ban prevents carrying firearms for self-defense (including in tents) and thus burdens a core Second Amendment right	Corps contends its regulation of its own lands is proprietary and may be analyzed under a lower standard; sites are sensitive and populous so restrictions are justified	Court: The rule burdens Second Amendment conduct (self-defense); tents treated like homes for purposes of protection; burden exists
Level of scrutiny to apply	Plaintiffs: regulation affects core self-defense rights (strict or intermediate scrutiny)	Corps: as proprietor of land, regulation should receive rational-basis review	Court: applied two-step Chovan framework; found the tent ban implicates a core right (strict scrutiny) but resolved case under intermediate scrutiny because § 327.13 fails even that test
Whether the Corps’ safety and infrastructure interests justify the regulation	Plaintiffs: interests can be addressed by narrower, tailored measures that allow self-defense	Corps: public-safety, dam/security, and crowd-safety interests justify broad prohibition; Corps has more leeway since it’s not required to open lands to public	Court: Interests are important, but the regulation is substantially broader than necessary and flatly bans self-defense possession — fails reasonable-fit requirement under intermediate scrutiny
Entitlement to preliminary injunction	Plaintiffs: likely to succeed on merits; constitutional injury is irreparable; equities/public interest favor injunction	Corps: injunction is effectively mandatory and disfavored; plaintiffs must meet higher standard	Court: injunction is prohibitory (not mandatory); plaintiffs showed likelihood of success, irreparable harm, and favorable equities/public interest; injunction granted

Key Cases Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes individual right to possess handguns in the home for self-defense and notes sensitive-place exceptions)
U.S. v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (articulates two-step test for Second Amendment challenges)
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (intermediate-scrutiny reasonable-fit analysis and tailoring principle for firearms regulation)
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (struck down near-total ban on carrying firearms outside the home)
U.S. v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011) (upheld a National Park regulation banning loaded firearms where self-defense was meaningfully accommodated)
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standard for injunctions and review of prohibitory relief)
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (sliding-scale test for preliminary injunction: serious questions plus balance of hardships)
Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (distinguishes government acting as proprietor vs. lawmaker but did not address self-defense core right)
U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (discusses distinction between governmental actions as proprietor and as regulator)