376 P.3d 836
N.M.2016Background
- Petitioners (three physicians and a patient advocate) sought a declaration that New Mexico’s assisted-suicide statute, NMSA 1978, § 30-2-4, does not apply to physician aid‑in‑dying (prescribing lethal medication for a competent, terminally ill patient to self‑administer) or is unconstitutional as applied under the New Mexico Constitution.
- The district court held § 30-2-4 applied but that prosecuting physician aid‑in‑dying violated New Mexico Constitution (arts. II, §§ 4 and 18); it applied strict scrutiny and invalidated the statute as applied.
- The Court of Appeals was divided: it agreed § 30-2-4 applied but disagreed on whether the right is fundamental; it remanded for further scrutiny analysis (no majority on level of scrutiny).
- The Supreme Court considered whether physician aid‑in‑dying falls within § 30-2-4’s prohibition on “assisting suicide,” and whether the New Mexico Constitution independently protects a right to physician aid‑in‑dying.
- The Court concluded the plain statutory definition covers physician aid‑in‑dying and—following federal substantive‑due‑process precedent (notably Glucksberg)—held there is no fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution; it declined to find New Mexico’s Constitution supplied a broader right and applied a heightened rational‑basis review, upholding § 30-2-4 as rationally related to legitimate state interests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 30-2-4 (assisting suicide) apply to physician aid‑in‑dying? | Aid‑in‑dying is a medical practice distinct from suicide and should be excluded. | Text of § 30-2-4 criminalizes aiding another in taking their own life; prescribing lethal medication is providing the means to do so. | Held: § 30-2-4 plainly covers physician aid‑in‑dying. |
| Does the U.S. Constitution protect a right to physician aid‑in‑dying? | Competent, terminal patients have a due‑process liberty interest in aid‑in‑dying. | Federal precedent (Glucksberg) rejects a fundamental right to assisted suicide; only limited, particularized challenges might succeed. | Held: Under federal law, no categorical fundamental right; Glucksberg controls. |
| Does New Mexico Constitution (arts. II, §§ 4 or 18) protect an independent right to physician aid‑in‑dying? | New Mexico’s history of protecting patient autonomy and natural‑rights clause (Art. II, § 4) justify broader protection than federal law. | State constitutional text, statutes (UHCDA, Pain Relief Act) and precedent do not create an enforceable right to physician‑assisted death; protections and exceptions are legislative. | Held: No distinctive state constitutional characteristic requires departure from Glucksberg; Article II, § 4 does not establish a fundamental/important right to aid‑in‑dying. |
| If no fundamental right, is § 30-2-4 constitutional under rational basis (New Mexico’s heightened test)? | Statutory safeguards used elsewhere show aid‑in‑dying can be regulated narrowly; criminalization is not narrowly tailored. | State has legitimate interests: protecting life, medical ethics, vulnerable persons, and preventing euthanasia expansion; UHCDA and Pain Relief Act show legislative role and safeguards. | Held: Under New Mexico’s rational‑basis (requiring a firm legal rationale), § 30-2-4 is rationally related to legitimate state interests and is constitutional on its face and as applied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding assisted‑suicide bans do not violate federal substantive due process and identifying legitimate state interests supporting bans)
- Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009) (Montana court recognized consent defense to homicide for physician aid‑in‑dying under state statutory framework)
- Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (assumed competent persons have a protected interest to refuse lifesaving treatment; informed‑consent foundations)
- Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (discussion of defining fundamental rights broadly; critique of Glucksberg’s narrow‑definition approach)
- Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (recognition of personal autonomy principles relevant to liberty analyses)