Morris Johnson v. Ohio Dep't of Public Safety
942 F.3d 329
| 6th Cir. | 2019Background
- Morris Johnson, a Black Ohio state trooper, engaged in multiple incidents of sexualized conduct toward women he encountered while on duty (pulling over and propositioning intoxicated women; one incident involved a stop without probable cause and handing out his personal number).
- After an initial incident, the Department imposed a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) on Johnson: another violation of specified rules would result in termination.
- Johnson thereafter stopped another woman for DUI, failed to record the encounter on his in-car camera, rode her home and stayed at her house for over 30 minutes, and later texted her from his personal phone; the Department fired him for violating the LCA.
- Johnson (plaintiff) pointed to David Johnson, a white trooper who received only a one-day suspension for off-duty contacts and social-media messages with women, as a comparator to support a Title VII disparate-treatment claim.
- The district court (Judge Marbley) and the Sixth Circuit majority (Judge Thapar) held Johnson failed to show a similarly situated comparator in relevant respects; Judge Moore dissented, arguing Johnson met the low prima facie burden and the case should proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson identified a proper comparator similarly situated to him | David Johnson engaged in comparable misconduct (using personal contact to pursue women encountered in enforcement contexts) and was treated more favorably | The two troopers’ conduct differed in material ways (on-duty vs off-duty; intoxicated/detained victims; unverified report; stayed at a woman’s home; camera off), different supervisors, and Johnson was bound by an LCA | The majority: Not similarly situated in all relevant respects; differences justify disparate outcomes; no prima facie case established |
| Effect of Last Chance Agreement (LCA) on comparability | LCA governs sanction not the substantive standard; it should be considered at later stages, not to defeat prima facie showing | LCA put Johnson on explicit notice that a subsequent violation would lead to termination, a crucial distinction justifying harsher discipline | Majority: LCA is a crucial, dispositive distinction supporting different treatment; dissent: LCA should not bar prima facie showing and is for later analysis |
| Proper application of Mitchell/Ercegovich comparator inquiry and prima facie burden | The comparator inquiry is flexible; plaintiff’s prima facie burden is low and evidence should be viewed in plaintiff’s favor to let a jury decide | Mitchell factors (same conduct, supervisor, standards) are relevant and, applied here, show non-comparability | Majority applied relevant factors and found no genuine issue of material fact; dissent argued the majority imposed too strict a prima facie burden and would remand |
| Whether the Department’s termination was discriminatory under Title VII | Johnson: differential treatment and disciplinary disparity permit inference of intentional race discrimination | Department: termination was nondiscriminatory enforcement of LCA and response to far more serious on-duty misconduct | Held: No discriminatory intent shown; judgment for employer affirmed (majority); dissent would allow claim to proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1992) (articulated key factors for comparator analysis)
- Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998) (adopted a flexible "in all relevant respects" comparator inquiry)
- Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2016) (comparability assessed by how employer views and disciplines infractions; discussed LCAs)
- Redlin v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 921 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2019) (Mitchell factors are relevant but not inflexible)
- Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2012) (prima facie burden is not onerous; focus on intentional discrimination)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (employer’s view of infractions and intent are central in discrimination analysis)