Mornay v. National Union Fire Insurance
331 Ga. App. 112
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Plaintiffs sued Southeastrans, Inc. and National Union for Sylvia Mornay’s death under OCGA § 40-1-112 direct action statute against insurers of motor carriers.
- National Union moved for summary judgment, arguing the van was exempt from the motor carrier definition under OCGA § 40-1-100 (12) (B) (vii).
- Trial court granted summary judgment in National Union’s favor; Plaintiffs appeal.
- Drop-4-Care Transportation operated the vehicle, a 2002 Ford Ecoline E-350, retrofitted for wheelchair transport, with a reduced capacity.
- DCH contracted with Southeastrans to broker non-emergency medical transport in Georgia; Southeastrans contracted with Drop-4-Care to provide transportation services.
- On April 19, 2010, the Drop-4-Care van transported Mornay to a medical appointment; the accident occurred while en route; National Union insured Southeastrans.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Drop-4-Care van qualify for the motor carrier exemption? | Van not used exclusively for medical transport. | Van used exclusively for medical transport under contract. | Yes; exemption applies. |
| Does the vehicle’s capacity affect the exemption (capable of more than ten persons)? | Designed capacity >10 seats; could transport more than ten. | Actual seating capacity governs; after retrofitting, ≤4 passengers. | Capable meaning actual capacity; not >10, so exemption stands. |
| Who bears the burden of proving the exemption at summary judgment? | Opposing party not required to prove non-exemption. | Movant bears burden to prove exemption. | National Union bears burden and cannot rely on absence of contrary evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. of North Carolina, 302 Ga. App. 677 (Ga. App. 2010) (direct action and burden of proof for exemptions under motor carrier act)
- Werner Enterprises v. Stanton, 302 Ga. App. 25 (Ga. App. 2010) (strict compliance with direct action statute; exemptions matter)
- Smith v. Southern Gen. Ins. Co., 222 Ga. App. 582 (Ga. App. 1996) (exemption required; cannot sue insurer if vehicle exempt)
- Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167 (Ga. 1996) (disjunctive statutory language governs exemption interpretation)
- Couch v. Red Roof Inns, 291 Ga. 359 (Ga. 2012) (statutory term 'capable' construed by ordinary meaning)
- Archer Western Contractors v. Estate of Pitts, 292 Ga. 219 (Ga. 2012) (contextual reading of statute for meaning of seating capacity)
- May v. State, 295 Ga. 388 (Ga. 2014) (statutory interpretation informed by related provisions)
- Belcher v. Bremer, 253 Ga. App. 745 (Ga. App. 2002) (relevance of current statute when precedent applies)