Morin v. Tormey, 626 F.3d 40

Morin, a long-time OCFC executive assistant, became Chief Clerk in 1994 and Deputy Chief Clerk in 1986.
In 2002, Tormey and Voninski pressured Morin to assist in political maneuvering against Judge Klim; she refused, stating her duties did not involve spying in elections.
Following refusal, Morin endured adverse actions through 2006, including resource denial, long commutes for reassignment, and a leaky basement office.
In 2006 Morin was informally told she had angered the right person and would face consequences; in 2007 she was removed as Chief Clerk and demoted.
Morin sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation and hostile work environment for refusing partisan political activity.
District Court denied the defendants’ summary-judgment motion on qualified-immunity grounds; appellate panel considered immediate appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Morin’s retaliation claim defeats qualified immunity	Morin’s right to decline political activity was violated.	Facts show no clearly established right or qualified-immunity entitlement.	Morin may proceed; qualified-immunity not established on current record.
Whether Morin was a policymaker exempt from First Amendment protection	Morin’s role heightens potential policymaker status due to duties and contacts.	Morin lacks sufficient policymaker control or influence; not an appropriate requirement for office.	Not a policymaker as a matter of law; no qualified-immunity basis established.
Whether the appeal is immediately reviewable	Disputed facts should foreclose immediate appeal.	District Court denied summary judgment on the law, allowing appeal.	Appellate jurisdiction confirmed; appeal allowed to review law-based denial.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (distinguishes between employee speech as part of duties vs. private citizen concerns)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (case on when speech emerges as protected activity in the workplace)
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1968) (speech protection depends on relation to official duties)
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (U.S. 1990) (prohibition on discharge for political affiliation)
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (U.S. 1980) (policymaker exception to First Amendment protection)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (U.S. 1976) (political loyalty as a condition of public employment in certain cases)
Vezzetti v. Pellegrini, 22 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1994) (non-exclusive factors for policymaker status)
Gordon v. County of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1997) (duties in job description vs. actual powers to determine policymaker)
Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1988) (rational connection between ideology and job performance relevant to policymaker status)
Danahy v. Buscaglia, 134 F.3d 1185 (2d Cir. 1998) (policymaker question is a question of law informed by job description)
Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (supervision of employees as a factor in policymaker analysis)
McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1997) (policymaker status and Pickering balance interplay)