Morgan v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
2014-Ohio-636
W.D. Va.2014Background
- Morgan was hired by Wells Fargo in Jan 2011 to work in its Roanoke call center, which enforces a mandatory attendance policy tied to a 40‑hour attendance account; hitting -41 or below triggers termination.
- Over a ten‑week period Morgan accrued many unscheduled absences that reduced her attendance balance to -45 after missing consecutive days at the end of April/early May 2011.
- On May 3–4 her supervisor sought and obtained Human Resources approval to terminate for policy violation; during the termination call Morgan disclosed she was seeking treatment for alcoholism.
- HR rescinded the termination, granted leave for treatment, excused her May–July absences as medical leave, and allowed Morgan to seek excusal for earlier absences by contacting the Accommodations team.
- Morgan failed to follow up with Accommodations (and later admitted she had not seen a doctor for the April dates); Wells Fargo reinstated termination on August 10, 2011 for remaining unexcused absences.
- Morgan sued under the ADA alleging disability discrimination and retaliation; Wells Fargo moved for summary judgment on the ground the termination rested on a legitimate, non‑discriminatory attendance‑policy violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Morgan was terminated because of disability in violation of the ADA | Morgan argues Wells Fargo terminated her due to alcoholism and treated her differently than similarly situated employees | Wells Fargo says it terminated Morgan for violating its mandatory attendance policy (legitimate, non‑discriminatory reason) | Court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo — plaintiff failed to show the proffered reason was pretextual |
| Whether Wells Fargo failed to accommodate or retroactively excuse absences under the ADA | Morgan contends she sought accommodation/leave and was discriminated by not having prior absences excused | Wells Fargo contends it granted prospective leave once informed and an employer need not retroactively accommodate; Morgan did not follow Accommodations team direction | Court refused to allow late amendment and held employer need not provide retroactive accommodation; Morgan did not pursue available process |
| Whether the timing of termination supports inference of discrimination/retaliation | Morgan points to temporal proximity between disclosure and termination as evidence of pretext/retaliation | Wells Fargo points to uncontradicted attendance records and warnings showing independent legitimate reason | Court found timing alone insufficient to overcome undisputed legitimate reason; no pretext shown |
| Whether Morgan established a prima facie retaliation claim under McDonnell Douglas | Morgan claims retaliation for requesting accommodation | Wells Fargo argues termination was for attendance violations, not retaliation, and that any accommodation request was granted prospectively | Court assumed arguendo a prima facie case but held Morgan could not prove pretext; summary judgment for Wells Fargo |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for proving intentional discrimination under the ADA)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden‑shifting and nonmoving party's duty to show genuine dispute)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and requirement that nonmoving party show more than a scintilla of evidence)
- Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007) (viewing facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2005) (definition of pretext as a dishonest explanation)
- Moman v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997) (types of weaknesses in employer's explanation that show pretext)
- White v. W.R. Winslow Mem'l Home, Inc., 211 F.3d 1266 (4th Cir. 2000) (pretext and discrimination analysis)
- Dugan v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 293 F.3d 716 (4th Cir. 2002) (timing alone insufficient to establish discrimination when legitimate reasons are unrebutted)
- Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 95 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (ADA does not require retroactive accommodation or a "fresh start")
- Kothe v. Cont'l Teves, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 466 (timing by itself does not overcome an unrebutted legitimate reason for adverse action)
